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ABSTRACT
Local subdivision policies (subdivision improvement standards, exactions,
and development fees) have been criticized in recent years for increasing
the cost of new housing. These pol icies ,allegedly increase the cost of
new housing by requiring more costly subdivision improvements than are
necessary for health and safety, and by shifting the cost of public
services from the public to the new home buyer through the use of develop-
ment fees and exactions. Critics have also complained that in many com-
munities the policies place an unfairly large economic burden on new home
buyers.
A case study of one community; Livermore, Californi-a, was used to examine
the validity of criticisms and to test the potenti:al i~mpact of alternative
policies.
Most subdivision improvement standards requi red by Livermore appear to be
based primarily on health and safety considerations. 'Most development
fees were used to defray capital improvement costs of new development,
but some fees were used for expenses not directly related to growth.
Subdivision policies were found to have a si gni ficant impact on construct-
ion costs. Livermore's development fees are nearly equal to 10% of the
cost of a new home and less expensive subdivisi'on improvement standards
could have reduced construction costs by approxihmately 10%.
The annual cost of home ownership was estimated for three alternati:ye
subdivision policy changes using Livermore as a model. The three policy
changes analyzed were: 1) use assessment districts instead of fees and
exactions, 2) reduce subdivision atandards, 3) eliminate fees and exact-
ions, and pay for all services with property taxes. The use of assessment
districts would have had little effect on the cost of home ownership in
Livermore. Reduci'ng subdivision standards would have had a moderate
impact on ownership costs. The substitution of property taxes for fees
and exactions, could -make a substantial reducti'on in home ownership costs
for purchasers of new homes while sli.ghtly increasing costs for owners of
existing homes.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Gary Hack
Title: Associate Professor of Urban Studies and
Environmental Desi gn
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CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION
Why are home prices so high? In attempting to answer this question
many academic researchers have looked past the obvious causes, high
interest rates and rising labor and materials costs, into the heart and
soul of the planning profession - land use regulation. These research-
ers, encouraged by a regulation weary building industry, have indicted a
host of local regulatory vehicles - growth controls, environmental and
aesthetic regulation, and subdivision policies. The last culprit, subdi-
vision policies, is the subject of this study.
The broad term subdivision policies, as used here, includes subdivi-
sion improvement standards, subdivision exactions, and development fees
imposed by local government. Studies of regulation and housing prices
have identified a number of aspects of subdivision regulation which add
to the cost of home ownership. The following criticisms of local govern-
ment subdivision policies were culled from a review of the-literature:
Excessive subdivision improvement standards increase the cost
of home ownership. Many communities require that developers
install subdivision features which are not needed (i.e., sidewalks,
neighborhood parks, street trees, underground power and telephone
lines) or require more of a feature than is needed (i.e., wide
streets, oversized utility lines, closely spaced manholes or fire
hydrants). The contention is that, where communities require expen-
sive subdivision improvements that do not add substantially to safe-
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ty or produce other public benefits, the cost of housing is unneces-
sarily increased.
The public service costs of new housing are being shifted from
local government to the new home buyer. Developers are increasing-
ly required to install or finance with development fees services
which were once provided by local government. These costs are
passed through to the homebuyer in the form of higher home prices.
Homebuyer financing of services is more expensive than government
financing of services, since mortgage interest rates are higher than
interest rates paid on municipal bonds. Fees and exactions are also
a more regressive way to finance services than are property taxes.
Developers are required to pay for services for the general pub-
lic.
In addition to paying for the services that new development
requires, developers, and through them new homebuyers, are required
to pay for services used by the general public. This may take the
form of a requirement that a developer build a bicycle path for use
by the whole city, install a sewerline which is sized to serve
offsite units as well as the developer's units, or pay a development
fee which is used for some general public purpose.
The basis of these criticisms is the belief that new home prices are
too high and local government should do what it can to lower prices.
Critics of subdivision policy contend that many communities take the
7
above actions to keep home prices up, supporting an unspoken policy of
excluding less affluent homebuyers or stopping growth altogether.
The following subdivision policy recommendations would seem to fol-
low from the criticisms:
- Communities should allow the least expensive subdivision improvements
commensurate with public health, safety, and welfare.
- All services should be financed with less expensive public debt and
paid for with progressive taxes rather than providing some services
with fees and exactions..
- If new development must pay for public services, it should pay for
only the services it requires and not for services for the general
public.
The criticisms and policy recommendations are based on the assump-
tion that if changes in local subdivision policies lower the cost of
constructing a home, the savings will be passed on to homebuyers. This
assumption has not gone unchallenged, but will be accepted for the analy-
sis in the following chapters. The assumption that savings will be
passed forward to homebuyer will be re-examined in the concluding chap-
ter.
The questions that this thesis seeks to answer- ard, how valid are
these criticisms of subdivision policy? and how would the policy recom-
mendations affect the price of new housing? Answering these questions
requires a detailed examination of local subdivision policies. To answer
these broad questions it was necessary to examine local subdivision
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policies in some detail and have sufficient data to model the impact of
policy changes on new home prices. It was decided that the case study
approach would best yield the level of detail required. Because of the
time constraints of the thesis writer, a case study of only one community
was undertaken, but the hope is that the community will be representative
of current trends in subdivision policy. Within the case study communi-
ty, one development was selected for a detailed analysis of construction
costs and to serve as the model upon which alternative subdivision
policies were tested.
The Case Study Community
The community chosen for the case study was Livermore, California.
Its location in the San Francisco Bay Area, a region noted for high home
prices and extensive regulation of development; and Livermore's develop-
ment fees, which have always been among the golden state's highest, made
Livermore an appropriate choice. The case study community was identified
by a past president of a Bay Area builders association as a community
with "excessive" subdivision improvement standards.
Livermore is a city of 48,000 located on the eastern edge of the San
Francisco - Oakland SMSA. It is considered to be an urban fringe commu-
nity located a half hour commute from employment centers in Oakland and
forty minutes from San Francisco. Thirty-eight percent of Livermore's
residents commute beyond the Livermore area to work.
.One of Livermore's chief attractions is its housing stock which is
less expensive than other portions of the San Francisco Bay Area. The
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community has long been a place where Bay Area residents could commute a
few more miles and save money on mortgage payments. One might say that
Livermore is where many families, without the financial resources to pur-
chase a home in the region's core areas went to fulfill their dreams.
Bill Owens' well known pictorial essay of the American lifestyle, Subur-
bia, was shot inside and outside of Livermore's ubiquitous three-bedroom
two car garage, ranch style homes. Says Owens of Livermore home owners:
The people I met enjoy the lifestyle of the suburbs. They
have realized the American Dream. They are proud to be
homeowners and to have achieved material success.(1)
Livermore experienced rapid growth during the 1960's with its popu-
lation more than doubling (from 16,000 to 38,000) between the 1960 and
1970 census. Rapid growth strained the city's services during the 1970's
and a number of growth control measures were instituted. Air quality,
school over crowding, sewer and water system problems spurred anti-growth
sentiment, and in 1972 Livermore voters passed a local ballot initiative
which placed a moratorium on new building permits until school, sewer,
and water problems were solved. The initiative was challenged in court
and finally upheld in 1976 by the California Supreme Court.(2)
Livermore voters also elected a no-growth city council which
instituted a growth management plan that featured a 2% limit on housing
unit construction. During the period 1975 to 1978, the council further
(1) Bill Owens, Suburbia (San Francisco: Straight Arrow Books, 1973).
(2) Bernard J. Frieden, The Environmental Protection Hustle, (Cambridge:
MIT Press, 1979) pp. 26-27.
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restricted growth to 50 units per year, though the 2% limit would have
allowed 300 to 350 units per year.
In 1978, a city council less opposed to growth was elected. This
council has authorized the maximum number of units (350) each year and
also made a commitment to low income housing. Section 8 funds have been
used to initiate the construction of low income housing and an
inclusionary zoning ordinance was also passed. Despite the increase in
.dwelling unit authorizations since 1978, building activity has been slow
and construction has lagged behind authorizations.
The Case Study Development
The housing development selected for detailed analysis consisted of
800 units built by the same developer from 1964 to 1972. The development
will be referred to throughout as Suburban Homes, an alias used to pre-
serve the anonymity of the homebuilder. All of the units in the case
study development are quite similar. All have 3 to 4 bedrooms, two car
garages, and most lots are 6,500 to 7,500 square feet. As with other
portions of the Bay Area, prices have increased rapidly. The first units
sold in 1965 carried price tags which averaged around $20,000. Today
many units sell for more than $100,000.
The Study
Subdivision development standards are the subject of Chapter 11.
The rationale behind Livermore's standards is examined and an estimate of
the cost of "excessive" standards and who benefited from them is made.
In Chapter III we shall see why Livermore makes such extensive use of
11
development fees, how the fees have increased, and for what purposes fees
are used. Chapter IV models the impact that alternative subdivision
policies would have on the affordability of new housing in Livermore. In
Chapter V, conclusions and recommendations are presented.
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CHAPTER 11 SUBDIVISION DEVELOPMENT STANDARDS
HISTORY
The subdivision of land into separate plats begins on the land
planner 's table with the drawing of streets and property lines, but title
to individual lots can only be transferred after the subdivision has been
recorded by local authorities. Plat registration is considered a privi-
lege and not a right. Local government may, as permitted by state legis-
latures, attach conditions to the extension of this privilege.
The first subdivision regulations appeared in the late 1800's and
were enacted to facilitate plat recording and transfer of title. More
extensive regulation was prompted by the real estate booms of the 1920's.
In the speculative atmosphere which existed prior to the stockmarket
crash, many communities witnessed excessive subdivision of land.
Fly-by-night developers and poorly planned subdivisions created problems
for municipalities. Too many subdivisions too soon deflated property
values and created instability in real estate markets. Deflation of
property values in many instances led to tax delinquency and abandoned or
partially completed subdivisions.
At this time, most subdivision improvements (roads, sewers, water-
lines, etc.) were installed at public expense. Public works required
for new development were financed by municipal debt which was paid for
through property taxes or assessments. A municipality which was left
with a poorly planned or partially completed subdivision, had to repay
13
the debt without the tax receipts that a fully occupied subdivision pro-
vides.
By requiring a developer to either complete subdivision improvements
or provide a bond, municipalities were able to increase the subdivider's
financial stake in the success of a development and shift some of the
risk from the public treasury. Minimum standards for construction and
design were imposed on developers to prevent low-grade subdivisions which
adversely affect neighboring property values and entail high future main-
tenance expenditures. Since World War II, municipalities have added
parks, schools, bicycle lanes, and various offsite improvements to the
list of conditions that must be met before the subdivision of land, in
the form of a final subdivision map, can be recorded.
REGULATION COST STUDIES
From the very beginning it was recognized that subdivision standards
would not only improve the quality of residential development, but also
increase its cost. In 1934, Albert Farwell Bemis wrote:
Compliance with minimum standards with respect to street
grading and installation of water mains and sanitary sewers
often may increase the total home cost as much as 20
percent.(1)
More recently, rapidly rising home prices have sparked many investi-
gations into the effects of local government regulation on home prices.
Subdivis-ion regulations along with zoning regulations, growth controls,
(1) Albert Farwell Bemis, The Evolving House, (Cambridge: The Technology
Press 1934).
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and time consuming permit procedures have been accused of contributing to
the high cost of housing. A survey of the building industry by Seidel
found that developers identified "excessive" subdivision regulations as a
contributor to the high cost of housing:
Far and away the area of regulation cited as containing
the most unnecessary costs was subdivision controls. Over 72
percent of the respondents estimated that unnecessary aspects
of this area of regulation were responsible for more than 5
percent of the total price of the unit.(1)
Research into the impact of local government regulation on housing
costs has taken two approaches, one which examines the impact of regula-
tions on the cost of constructing a new home, the other which examines
the impact of regulation on home sale prices.
The distinction between the cost of producing a unit and the sale
price of a unit is an important one. While most developers claim that
increasing construction costs and increasing sale prices are one and the
same, many economists argue that in a competitive market some of the
costs of regulation will be passed back to the developer or land owner
(the incidence of costs imposed by regulation will be more fully explored
in Chapter V).
Researchers focusing on sale prices have generally used statistical
methods to look for association between high home prices and local regu-
lations thought to contribute to high home prices. Due probably to the
rapid growth in home prices and extensive government regulation which
(1) Stephen R. Seidel, Housing Costs and Government Regulations:
Confronting the Regulatory Maze, (Camden: Center for Urban Policy
Research, Rutgers University 1978) p. 37.
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characterizes the region, the San Francisco Bay Area has been the subject
of a number of such studies.
Katz and Rosen used regression analysis to study home prices in the
San Francisco Bay Area and concluded that growth moritoria and growth
controls have raised home prices between 18-28% in those communities
where they were present.(1)
Gabriel and Wolch also employed regression analysis to analyze regu-
lations impact on Bay Area home prices. Local attitudes toward growth,
development fees and exactions, and large lot zoning were all found to
affect sales prices. After controlling for traditional determinants of
house prices, the three local government regulatory variables were found
to account for approximately 14% of the price of a typical Bay Area
home.(2)
Dowall used a similar method to measure the effect of land avail-
ability, permissible residential density and development fees on Bay Area
home prices. He concluded that the direct cost effects of local regula-
tions are "not as great as some critics of land use controls allege". He
found that:
(1) Lawrence Katz, and Kenneth T. Rosen, "The Effects Of Land Use
Controls On Housing Prices", Institute of Business and Economic
Research Working Paper No. 80-13, (Berkeley: University of
California at Berkeley, 1980).
(2) Stuart A. Gabriel, and Jennifer R. Wolch, "Local Land Use Regula-
tion And Urban Housing Values," Institute of Business and Economic
Research Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 80-18, (Berkeley:
University of California at Berkeley, 1980)
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the combined effect of increasing development densities by one
unit per acre, reducing development fees by 50 percent, and
doubling supplies of vacant land.. would be to lower the sales
price of a new home by $6,000. This estimate amounts to rough-
ly six percent of the average price of a new Bay Area home in
1979.(1)
Researchers who have focused on the impact of regulation on the cost
of producing a new home rather than on sale prices, have generally
utilized case studies and surveys of local land use regulation to deter-
mine its impact on the cost components of housing. Several of these
studies have attempted to measure the cost of "excess" subdivision stan-
dards. Excess standards are usually defined as those which exceed
health, safety, and welfare requirements.
The U.S. Government Accounting Office in a 1978 report to Congress
descriptively titled Why Are New Home Prices So High, How Are They
Influenced By Government Regulations, And Can Prices Be Reduced surveyed
subdivision requirements in 87 communities and concluded that adoption of
17 less expensive requirements for streets, sidewalks, driveways, and
water and sewer systems could result in an average savings of $1,300 a
unit.(2) Potential savings ranged from zero in two communities to $2,655
in one community. The highest potential savings ($2,655) equaled 6% of
(1) David E. Dowall, and John D. Landis, "Land Use Controls And Housing
Costs: An Examination Of San Francisco Bay Area Communities",
University of California (Unpublished paper) no date. p. 37.
(2) U.S. Government Accounting Office, Why Are New House Prices So High,
How Are They Influenced By Government Regulations, And Can Prices Be
Reduced, Division of Environmental Studies, University of California
at Davis. Unpublished draft, no date.
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the national, average sale price of a new single family home ($44,000)
during the time that the research was undertaken (1976).
In a study of City of Davis, California's development regulations
Johnston, Schwartz, and Hunt examined the impact of fees, dedications,
delay and excessive development standards on the cost of producing a sin-
gle family home. Nonessential regulation was estimated to contribute
$7,707 (13.8% of total coat) to the cost of building a $56,000 house.
Out of that total, $3,827 (6.8% of home price) was attributed to excess
development standards.(1)
Seidel, in a case study of a New Jersey community, estimated that
out of the total cost of producing a new single family home, $1,200 could
be attributed to direct costs (permits, plan reviews, inspection bonds),
$400 to the cost of delay, and $1,700 to the cost of unnecessary or
excessive requirements (wide streets, sidewalks on both sides of the
street, street trees, underground utilities etc.).(2) Government regula-
tions were found to directly account for $3,300 or 8.7% of the final
selling price of a unit.
(1) Robert R. Johnston, Seymore I Schwartz, and William S. Hunt, "The
Effect of Local Development Regulations on Single Family Housing
Costs", Division of Environmental Studies, Univesity of California at
Davis. Unpublished draft.
(2) Stephen R. Seidel, Housing Costs and Government Regulations:
Confronting the Regulatory Maze. p. 53.
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THE LIVERMORE CASE STUDY
The Livermore case study, as did prior studies, will attempt to mea-
sure the impact of "excessive" subdivision standards on the cost of
constructing a new home. However, in order to more fully address the
fairness of these regulations we need to probe a little deeper, asking
what was the rationale behind the standards (why were they adopted) and
who benefited?
DEFINING EXCESSIVE STANDARDS
In order to calculate the cost of excessive subdivision regulation
one must first define what is excessive. In an afterword to Seidel's
study, Christina Ford used the following definition of over regulation:
...those forms or variations of governmentally imposed
controls which exceed minimum health, safety, and welfare con-
siderations in the provision of housing.(1)
The Davis study utilizes a definition of "nonessential" regulation as
contained.in a HUD publication Final Report of the Task Force On Housing
Costs (1978) which recommended that:
The consumer of new housing should be required to bear no more
than the cost of site improvements internal to the site which
can be justified as necessary to protect the basic health,
safety and property of future residents of the site, protect
environmental quality of the community, and ensure that only
normal maintenance will be required over the generally accepted
economic life of streets or utilities to be dedicated to the
government.
19
(1) Stephen R. Seidel, Housing Costs and Government Regulations:
Confronting the Regulatory Maze, p. 317.
The community at large should bear the cost of:
a) Government requirements which are of a standard higher than
the minimums specified by HUD to protect health, safety, prop-
erty, air and water quality, and assume reasonable maintenance
costs;
b) Extra-sized pipes or streets on the site, or off-site
streets, sewage treatment capacity and interceptor lines needed
to serve primarily existing and future residents living off the
site, and;
c) Schools, parks libraries, and fire stations.(1)
The studies cited above determined the portion of home construction
cost which could be attributed to excessive subdivision improvement stan-
dards by calculating the cost savings which could have been achieved with
less stringent standards. Those less stringent standards were based on
the author's estimate of the reasonable minimum level of subdivision
improvements needed to insure health, safety, and welfare requirements.
A slightly different approach was taken for the Livermore case
study. Instead of comparing Livermore's subdivision improvement stan-
dards to a set of reasonable minimum standards, a market approach was
taken. Livermore's standards were compared to those standards which con-
sumers would impose through the housing market. The assumption behind
this approach is that if a reasonable minimum standard is not accepted by
consumers, developers will not take advantage of it. The GAO study lends
support to this position:
20
(1) Task Force On Housirg Costs, Final Report of the Task- force On
Housing Costs, (Washington D.C.: Department of Housing and Urban
Development, 1978) pp. 26-27.
According to local officials whose communities had
established minimum house sizes, most new houses generally
exceed the local minimum by at least 300 square feet. In only
three communities did new houses usually approximate the mini-
mum requirement. Most officials said consumer demand was the
main reason bigger houses were built.(1)
Using the market approach, the question is not how much do
Livermore's subdivision improvement standards exceed reasonable minimums,
but how much do they exceed the level of improvements which would have
been provided by the developer in the absence of local subdivision regu-
lations?
The question was put to the developer of Suburban Homes. The type
of subdivision improvements that a developer would install is to a cer-
tain extent based on the type of home buyer being targeted.
The market strategy employed for Suburban Homes, was to produce a low
cost home which would appeal to first time home buyers. During the.late
1960's the housing market in Alameda County, the county in which
Livermore is located, was very competitive and considered one of the most
active submarkets in the San Francisco region. (2) The developer chose to
build in Livermore because, though somewhat distant from employment cen-
ters land prices were lower than in communities located in the core areas
of the Bay Area. In retrospect, the developer felt that they had been
(1) U.S. Government Accounting Office, Why Are New House Prices So High,
How Are They Influenced By Government Regulations, And Can Prices Be
Reduced, p. 12.
(2) U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Analysis of the
San Francisco-Oakland, California Housing Market, (Washington D.C.:
HUD 1969) .
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successful in marketing their units because they had been offering homes
at a low price and offered "more for the money" than lower priced units
in the region.
Because of the price competition in the market during the late
1960's, the developer wanted to construct the units as inexpensively as
possible and felt that home buyers would have been willing to tradeoff a
number of City mandated features for a lower purchase price.
The developer of Suburban Homes felt that Livermore requirements for
the following features were too high:
- Street Width. Livermore requires a 40ft curb-to-curb street width
for secondary streets. The developer considered this too wide a street
width, which detracted from the desirability of the units.
- Curbs. Rolled curbs are less expensive than city mandated mono-
lithic curbs and would have been the preferred choice of the developer.
- Sidewalks. Consumers purchasing homes in the Suburban Homes
development were looking for the best deal for their money and the
developer felt that a lack of sidewalks would not have affected their
purchase decision.
- Fire Hydrants. More fire hydrants were required than thought nec-
essary.
- Street Trees. 15 gallon street trees were required, but 5 gallon
trees were said to be less expensive and less likely to suffer from
root shock.
- Park Dedication. One acre per 100 units was the required park
22
dedication, it was felt that no park dedication was needed.
- Lot Dimensions. The units could have been built on smaller lots
with less street frontage than allowed by Livermore.
Livermore's other development standards were either considered to be fair
or lower than what the market would demand by the developer.
The Director of Public Works and the Director of City Planning for
the City of Livermore were interviewed to determine the basis for subdi-
vision standards targeted as excessive by the developer of Suburban
Homes. Daniel J. Lee, the Director of Public Works emphasized that the
public works requirements for street width, sidewalks, and curbs were
based on health and safety considerations. In Livermore, secondary
streets and cul-de-sacs must have a 60ft right of way, within which is-
40ft of paved street surface (Figure 1), while collector streets have a
72ft right of way and 52ft of paving.
23
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FIGURE. 1 Livermore Road Sections
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Pedestrian safety was given as the primary reason for the 40ft width
which allows for 8ft parking lanes on either side of the street and two
12ft travel lanes. Narrower street standards were criticized as less
safe:
Some jurisdictions have 32ft streets. Once you get cars
parked on either side you're using up eight feet of each side.
That leaves sixteen feet in the middle, or two eight ft travel
lanes. An eight ft travel lane doesn't give you enough reac-
tion time when children dart out from behind cars. We think
that our pedestrian safety record is a lot better here.(1)
The safety of children and the convenience of motorists were justi-
fications given for 5ft concrete sidewalks on either side of residential
streets:
We require sidewalks on both sides of the street and adja-
cent to the curb because when people are stepping out of their
automobiles they step onto sidewalk instead of grass. When
children are playing along a residential street and there is a
sidewalk on only one side they have to cross the street to get
to the other side and that becomes a safety hazard. We think
that the cost of the sidewalk is relatively small, and contrib-
utes a lot to safety.(2)
A monolithic curb was preferred over the rolled variety for mainte-
nance reasons and the convenience of pedestrians. Mr. Lee observed that
in communities with rolled curbs one finds automobiles with their tires
up on the sidewalk. These improperly parked cars not only block pedes-
trian traffic, but damage the sidewalk, "sidewalks aren't designed to
(1) Interview with.Daniel J. Lee, Director of Public Works for the City
of Livermore. Livermore, California. January 21, 1982.
(2) Ibid.
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carry vehicular loads and consequently you find your sidewalks being bro-
ken up".
The undergrounding of utilities has been required in Livermore since
1967, Mr. Lee noted that there hadn't been a big local push to under-
ground utilities, but the requirement was adopted as a result of a
statewide push to underground utilities initiated by the California Pub-
lic Utilities Commission. The placement of fire hydrants in new develop-
ments is set by the Livermore Fire Department.
While public works requirements seem to have been constructed from
some very explicit safety considerations; park dedication, lot coverage
and side yard requirements were based on a rationale which appears to
have been obscured by time. The park dedication standard-was created by
a study group in the early 1960's. Neither Mr. Lee nor Howard Nies, the
Director of Planning were quite sure as to how the original standard of 1
acre per 100 units was chosen or why it was subsequently changed to 2
acres per 100 units.
Mr Nies observed that the side yard and lot width requirements were
larger than those of most communities in which he'd worked and that they
"probably cause new home buyers some problems." He added that he didn't
think the sideyard requirements were "all that good", and that they had
been adopted at the urging of "a strong group within the community."
From the interview with the developer of Suburban Homes a set of
minimum standards, which will be referred to as the Substitute Standards,
26
were constructed. The purpose of creating the Substitute Standards was
not to determine how subdivisions should be constructed, or to question
Livermore's choice of standards, but to test the validity of the theory
that "excess" subdivision standards increase the cost of producing a new
home.
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TABLE 1
LIVERMORE STANDARDS AND SUBSTITUTE STANDARDS
LIVERMORE STANDARDS SUBSTITUTE STANDARDS
40ft paved width for 26ft paved width for secondary
secondary streets streets
5ft sidewalks on both sides No sidewalks
of the street
Monolithic curb Rolled curb
Street trees No street trees
Fire hydrants every 400ft Fire hydrants every 800ft
Park dedication No park dedication
Minimum lot width 65ft and Reduce lot width to 55ft and
minimum lot size 6,500sf* lot size to 5,500sf
*Minimum standards for tract A which is in a RL-6-5 zone.
The Substitute Standards are based on the following criteria:
Streets. Though the developer did not indicate a preferred street width
he indicated that he would have relied upon three documents authored by
Christian P. Boddum, and the Urban Land Institute.(1) While both docu-
ments caution that proper street width depends on local conditions, both
offer recommendations. The ULI study suggest a 26ft pavement width for
typical residential streets and a 36ft width for collector and
subcollector streets.
(1) Christian P. Boddum, "Residential Street Widths", unpublished.
Commi.ssioned by the Association of Home Builders of the Greater East
Bay. Christian P. Boddum, Consulting Civil Engineer, Oakland,
California. (undated).
Urban- Land Institute, American Society of Civil Engineers, National
Association of Homebuilders, Residential Street Widths, Jointly
published by ULI, ASCE, and NAH. New York and Washington D.C., 1974.
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The 26ft width provides for parking on both sides of the street and
a single traffic lane.
The level of resident inconvenience occasioned by the lack
of two moving lanes is remarkably low. In fact, no appreciable
difference in driver convenience generally is noted between a
26-ft wide and a 36-foot wide pavement unless the neighborhood
layout permits travel distances in excess of three blocks
between dwelliing and a collector street.(1)
Personal observation in the Suburban Homes development supports the pre-
vious statement. There were not large numbers of cars parked on the sub-
divisions streets and even during commute hours traffic on secondary
streets was very light.
Boddum also recommends a 26ft width for cul-de-sacs and loop streets
which serve 50 or fewer dwelling units. A 26ft width is recommended for
a secondary street (serves 50 to 200 homes) and 40ft of paving for major
collector. The Suburban Homes subdivision consists primarily of
cul-de-sacs, loop streets, and a limited number of secondary streets
(which usually serve less than 100 homes) connected to a single major
collector. A street width of 4oft for the major collector and 26ft for
all other streets-was adopted as the Substitute Standard.
Parks. A developer can fulfill park requirements in Livermore through
the dedication of 2 acres of land per 100 units or payment of an in-lieu
fee. The developer of Suburban Homes indicated that he would not have
provided any parks in the absence of a park dedication requirement. He
felt that Livermore has ample recreation areas and that neighborhood
(1) Urban Land Institute, Residential Street Widths. p. 32.
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parks were underutilized. Therefore the Substitute Standard park dedica-
tion is zero. While elimination of the park standard would reduce the
amount of recreation area available to residents it would not be as dra-
conian as it sounds.
Land dedicated by home builders is used exclusively for neighborhood
parks which consist of playground equipment, picnic benches, and five to
six acres of lawn. However, Livermore is well endowed with parkland. In
addition to 106 acres of neighborhood parks, Livermore's 48,000 residents
enjoy the use of yards and recreation equipment at schools and 230 acres
of community parks, Special Use Parks, and District Parks. In the vicin-
ity of the suburban homes development there are, in addition to two
neighborhood parks, three schools and a special use park.
Fire Hydrants. Fire hydrants in the Suburban Homes development were an
average of 430ft apart. Since the developer did not express a preference
for a fire hydrant standard, it was arbitrarily decided to decrease the
number of fire hydrants by one half increasing fire hydrant spacing to
830ft.(1)
Lot Width. The developer of Suburban Homes would have liked to have
constructed units on smaller lots with smaller sideyards. In Tract A
Livermore's RL-6.5 zoning requires 6,500 sf lots, sideyards totaling
(1) In the City of Jacksonville, prior to the adoption of standards
requiring spacing of fire hydrants every 500ft, developers installed
hydrants at 1000ft intervals. See Gruen Gruen and Associates,
"Effects of Regulation On Housing Costs: Two Case Studies", ULI
Research Reports, No. 27, (Washington D.C.: Urban Land Institute,
1977)
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17ft, and a 65ft minimum lot width. For our Substitute Standard we
assume that the minimum standards are a 55ft lot width and a 5,500 sf lot
size which is a common size for Bay Area single family homes. In
Livermore, lot dimensions are governed by zoning regulations. These zon-
ing regulations are included in our analysis of subdivision regulation
because in some communities lot dimensions are set by subdivision regula-
tions.
Street Trees, Sidewalks, and Curbs. Rolled curbs are substituted for
monolithic curbs. Sidewalks are not required since the developer would
have omitted them. To simplify calculations the street tree requirement
is eliminated for the Substitute Standards.
THE COST OF EXCESS STANDARDS
The cost of meeting the standards defined as excess by the developer
of Suburban Homes was estimated through a close examination of one of the
eight tracts which make up the development, referred to here as Tract A
(see Figure 2). Tract A was zoned for 6,500 sf lots and constructed in
1964-1966. It has more than 100 units built at a density of 4.6 units
per acre. The park requirement was satisfied through dedication of land
and in-lieu fee payment.
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FIGURE 2
Map Of Case Study Development
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Excess subdivision requirements can increase the cost of producing
housing in two ways. They can increase the amount of labor and materials
required and also increase the amount of land area required for each
unit. Increasing the amount of land required for each unit, reduces the
density at which units are constructed. At lower densities, developers
must spread land costs over a smaller number of units.
The total savings which could have been achieved in Tract A through
the use of the Substitute Standards are presented in Table 2. The method
used to calculate cost saving is presented in Appendix A. The use of the
Substitute Standards instead of Livermore's subdivision improvement stan-
dards would have reduced the cost of developing units in Tract A by $1286
per unit. Out of this total $585 is savings due to construction cost
reductions. Under Livermore standards the tract was developed to a den-
sity of 4.6 units per acre. With the Substitute Standards the tract
could have been developed at a density of 6.1 units per acre. At the
higher density, land costs per unit would have been reduced by $683 per
unit.
In Table 2, the potential cost savings are broken down by type of
feature. The greatest cost savings can be achieved through reducing the
required lot dimensions. Reducing lot dimensions not only allows higher
residential densities, with less lot frontage fewer linear feet of road-
way, curbing, and utility lines are required.
Table 2 also presents the potential savings with the Substitute
Standards, using 1981 subdivision improvement prices. The 1981 findings,
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though calculated for a subdivision with the same characteristics as
Tract A, should be representative of 1981 units since homes being
constructed today in Livermore have virtually the same features as they
did in 1966.
TABLE 2
POTENTIAL COST SAVINGS WITH SUBSTITUTE STANDARDS
TRACT A
1964 1981
Eliminate Street Trees $5 $55
Rolled Curb Instead Of
Monolithic Curb $43 $164
Reduce Number of Fire
Hydrants By One-Half $12 $70
No Park Dedication $117 $646
Eliminate Sidewalks $244 $1413
Reduce Street Width
From 40' to 26' $252 $1497
Reduce Lot Width 10'
And Lot Size 100sf $613 $3834
Total $1286 $7679
Excess Standards and Home Price
The units in Tract A ranged in size from 1140 sf to 1742 sf and sold
in 1966 at prices ranging from $18,950 to $22,550. Since most of the
lots in the tract were the same size, the lot costs were similar for all
units.
The construction cost of houses in tract A was equal to 82.4% of the
sales price. The remaining 17.6% of sales price was for add-ons such as
profit, overhead, closing costs, advertising, sales commissions, and
mortgage buy downs. As a percent of construction costs, add-ons are
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TABLE 3
TOTAL COST OF EXCESS STANDARDS
AS A FRACTION OF HOME PRODUCTION COST AND SALES PRICE
Tract A 1966
Per Unit Cost Of Excess Standards $1286
Developer Add-On 21.4% $275
Total $1539
% of lowest priced unit ($18,950) 8.2%
% of highest priced unit ($22,550) 6.9%
1981 Conditions
Per Unit Cost Of Excess Standards $7679
Developer Add-On 21.4% $1643
Total $9322
% Of Median 1981 New Home Price ($96,000) 9.7%
equal to 21.4%. If we make the assumption that the cost savings from the
substitute standards would have been fully passed on to home buyers (a
somewhat controversial assumption to be more fully discussed in Chapter
V) then add-ons would also be reduced in proportion to lower construction
costs. If the 21.4% markup is included in the construction cost of meet-
ing excess standards then the purchase price of homes in Tract A could
have been reduced by 6.9% to 8.2%.
Table 3 also compares the cost of excessive standards for a 1981
unit to the Livermore median sale price for a single family residence for
that year. As a percentage of home price, the cost of excessive stan-
dards has increased somewhat between 1966 and 1981. This is to be
expected since the two major components of the cost of excess standards,
raw land price and subdivision improvement costs, have increased more
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rapidly than other construction costs. Between 1964 and 1981 the cost of
subdivision improvements and land in Livermore has increased five fold
while the cost of house construction has only increased four fold.
Benefits
After examining the cost of subdivision improvements, the next per-
tinent question is, who benefited from these expenditures? Did the sub-
division improvements that the developer installed only meet the service
requirements of his new units or was he supplying services to the general
public? In the case study subdivision it appears that improvements
installed by the developer are primarily used by the development's resi-
dents.
Parks are a feature whose benefits one might expect to spill over beyond
the boundaries of the development. However, in the case study develop-
ment, that did not appear to be true. The developer of Suburban Homes
dedicated two approximately 3 acre parcels which were later developed
into neighborhood parks by the Livermore park district.
The staff of the Livermore Area Recreation and Park District
informed me that developer dedications are used for neighborhood parks.
These parks are only intended for the use of residents within walking
distance (one-half to three-quarters of a mile) and are minimally
developed with play ground equipment and some picnic tables. Athletic
fields and other facilities which attract users on a city wide basis are
placed in community parks or schools for which developer dedications are
not used.
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It was the feeling of the staff that the neighborhood parks are used
almost entirely by nearby residents since there are many neighborhood
parks (eighteen) and they are not highly developed. The only instances
that they knew of where neighborhood parks were used by residents of oth-
er neighborhoods was for a youth soccer league.
Street trees, sidewalks, monolithic curbs, and wide streets would benefit
a larger audience than the developments residents if outsiders frequently
passed through. However, the street system of the Suburban Homes devel-
opment is somewhat self contained, and even its major collector street is
probably not often used by persons from outside of the tract.
Oversized utility lines were installed in several portions of the case
study development. However, the City of Livermore compensates builders
who are required to install sewage, water, or drainage pipes in excess of
the requirements of their developments.
Offsite improvements were also required by the City of Livermore as a
condition of approval for several of the tracts in the case study devel-
opment. The offsite improvements were sidewalks and trees installed in
front of a school bordering the tract and improvements to an expressway
(sidewalks, fencing, planters, and some street widening) which also
bounds the tract. The offsite improvements are used by the general pub-
lic that sends their children to the school and walk or drive along the
expressway. However, the per unit cost of these improvements was small
when spread out over the entire development. The cost of offsite
improvements was not included in the estimate of the cost of excessive
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standards since it was not known how these costs were charged to units
constructed over an 8 year period.
Apparently the benefits of excessive standards accrue to the devel-
opments residents. But how much do they benefit from excess standards.
One measure of the value of these benefits to residents is their willing-
ness to pay. If homebuyers place a high value on large lots or parks
they will be willing to pay more for houses with these features. Regres-
sion analysis was employed to test the relationship between subdivision
features and the sale price of homes. In order to minimize the number of
variables which could influence sale prices of homes, the analysis was
restricted to recent resales (1976-1981) in the Suburban Homes develop-
ment. Since all tracts in Livermore were built to the same subdivision
standards I could not easily compare homes with and without sidewalks or
compare houses on 26ft streets to houses on 40ft streets. However, with-
in the Suburban Homes development there was enough variation to test the
impact of several subdivision standards.
Sale prices for all homes sold in the Suburban Homes development
between 1976 and 1981 were obtained from the Southern Alameda County
Board of Realtors. There were a total of 181 observations. Subdivision
variables for each home were determined from the developers records, sub-
division maps, and aerial photographs.
The results of the least-squares regression analysis are given in
Table 1. The Sale Date variable was included to control for the rapid
inflation in home prices which took place from 1976 to 1981. This vari-
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TABLE 4
REGRESSION RESULTS
Independent Regression Standard Significance
Variable Coefficient Error
Sale Date 982.512 35.854 .000
House Size 20.919 2.864 .000
Lot Size .117 .484 .810
Swimming Pool 9876.343 1437.334 .000
Distance From Park -0.230 .930 .805
Street Width -61.198 127.415 .632
Street Length 1.366 .677 .045
Adjacent To Park -1140.782 3006.494 .705
Adjacent To Field 4006.683 2237.194 .075
Adjacent To Expressway 148.777 3267.244 .964
Corner Lot 3172.491 1445.438 .030
Constant 15438.897 5798.465 .009
Adjusted Rsquare .858
Sale Date is the date of sale for the observation, counted in month from
the first observed sale (December, 1976).
House Size is the size of the house in square feet.
Lot Size is the size of the unit's lot in square feet.
Swimming Pool is the presence or absence of a swimming pool
Distance From Park is the distance of the unit from the nearest park in
feet.
Street Width is the width of the street over 40ft.
Street Length is the length of the street on which unit is located, in
feet.
Adjacent To Park, means a park adjoins one side of the lot.
Adjacent to Field, an open field adjoins on side of the lot.
Adjacent to Expressway, there is an expressway along the rear property
line.
Corner Lot is a lot on a corner (streets on two sides).
Regression Coefficient tells you how much the price of a unit increases
when a particular variable is increased by one unit.
Standard Error is a measure of how much the actual values varied from the
predicted value.
Significance is the probability that the null hypothisis is true, or the
probability that the results are due to chance.
able measured the number of months between the first sale in the sample
and the observed sale. The analysis shows.that from 1976 to 1981 Subur-
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ban Homes units were increasing in price by $982 a month, which closely
approximates the average annual increase of $933 for median sales prices
for single family homes in Livermore (1977-1981).(1) Consumers appear to
be willing to pay $21 for each additional square foot of floor space and
will pay an additional $9,876 for a swimming pool. Corner lots appear to
be worth an additional $3,172. Lots adjacent to a field are worth an
additional $4006.
It appears that the variables which were used to represent the fea-
tures required by excess standards have no effect on home prices. The
lot size, distance from park, and street width variable all appear to
have no effect on sales price.(2)
In the Suburban Homes subdivision there was considerable variation
in lot size. Though most lots were either 6500, 7000, 7500 square feet,
but some odd sized lots on cul-de-sacs were as large as 10,000 sf. How-
ever, the regression analysis indicates that lot size has little observ-
able effect on sale price.
Since there are two schools and a community park close to the Subur-
ban Homes development, the difference between having the park dedication
requirement and not having any park dedication requirement is that units
(1) City of Livermore, Livermore Community General Plan 1976 to 1981,
(Livermore, revised 1981) p. 54c.
(2) The three variables all have coefficients which are less than half as
large as their standard error. The significance levels for the null
hypothesis is also above 60% for each variable, indicating that they
have almost no effect on sales price which can be observed through
the use of regression analysis.
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are closer to recreation facilities.(1) Are home buyers willing to pay
more to be closer to parks? The distance to par-k variable is the dis-
tance between a unit and the nearest park or school. The distance ranged
between 0 and 2700 feet. Since the distance from park variable appears
to have no effect on sale price, we could conclude that home buyers are
not willing to pay more for a Suburban Homes unit located close to a park
than for a house located at a greater distance from a park. A tentative
conclusion can be reached that the park standards do not produce economi-
cally measurable benefits. However, there are other explanations for
this result that make the conclusion slightly suspect. (2)
Since there are no streets in Suburban homes with a 26ft width, the
impact of excess street width requirements on resale prices had to be
measured indirectly. Within the development are secondary streets with a
40ft width and a collector street with a 52ft width. For the street
width variable 40ft streets were entered as zero while 52ft streets were
entered as 12. This variable also had no statistically significant
effect on resale price. Though we do not know whether consumers prefer a
26ft or a 40ft street width, the regression analysis indicates an indif-
ference between a 40ft and 52ft street width.
(1) The assumption here is that recreation facilities at schools and
Community parks are close substitutes for neighborhood parks.
(2) Perhaps homebuyers.who place a high value on parks do not care about
the distance to the nearest park but do care about the percent of
land area in the neighborhood devoted to open space.
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CONCLUSIONS
In Livermore, it would seem that those subdivision improvements
required by the city, above and beyond what developers would include to
meet market demand, make a significant contribution to the cost of
constructing a new home. However, that contribution, as a percentage of
home price has not increased a great deal between 1966 and 1981. This is
probably due to the fact that, with the exception of the park dedication
requirement (which doubled during that time period) the subdivision
improvement requirements examined have not changed since the 1950's. One
conclusion is that while excessive standards do add to the cost of build-
ing a home, they have not played much of a role in Livermore's home price
inflation.
The benefits from improvements installed by the developer of Subur-
ban Homes, appear to accrue to the residents of that development. The
cost of the required offsite improvements were rather small when spread
out over the entire development.
Though the residents of the Suburban Homes development were the pri-
mary beneficiaries of features labeled as "excessive" it does not appear
that they place a high value on all of those features. It is interesting
to note that the difference in construction cost between a 5500 sf lot
and a 6500 sf lot was $613 in 1966 ($3834 in 1981), but lot size appeared
to make little difference in resale price. If the extra lot size which
zoning regulations add does not result in a product which is more highly
valued by homebuyers, it is just a dead weight cost. A recent California
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survey of prospective homebuyers found that the most important consider-
ation in a new home purchase was the monthly payment and least important
consideration was lot size.(1)
Why does Livermore have its chosen subdivision standards? Conve-
nience, safety, and maintenance appear to be important considerations.
With the exception of park and lot dimension requirements, subdivision
standards do not appear to have an anti-growth or exclusionary intent.
Street, sidewalk, curb, street tree, and fire hydrant requirements date
back to the 1950's, well before the development of anti-growth sentiment.
If the intent is exclusionary they have done a poor job. Some units in
the Suburban Homes development were as small as 1100 sf. The next chap-
ter examines Livermore's development fees and it is in this area of sub-
division policy where political intent is more likely to be found.
(1) Lauren Tsujimoto,
Globe May 2, 1982.
"House Shoppers Exhibit A New Profile", Boston
43
CHAPTER III DEVELOPMENT FEES
Over the last 50 years, much of the burden of paying for public infra-
structure has been transferred from municipal budgets to private developers
and through higher sale prices to new homebuyers. In the 1920's, many
communities transferred responsibility for subdivision improvements
(streets, sidewalks, utility lines etc.) to developers. By the 1970's
many communities, especially in rapidly growing California, were asking
developers to provide land for parks and to pay development fees which were
used to install offsite capital improvements such as storm drainage sys-
tems, sewage treatment plants, reservoirs, and school facilities.
Development fees became commonplace in fast growing communities which
were having problems paying for the public works requirements which new
growth brings. The rationale behind the use of development fees to pay for
new services was that new growth should "pay its own way". It was assumed
that new homes contribute less in property taxes than the cost of providing
them with services. The deficit would then be borne by existing property
owners through higher property taxes. Financing new services with fees was
a politically easier course of action than asking existing property owners
to approve new bond issue since existing property owners had no vested
interest in seeing any new development.
The number of communities instituting development fees, and the size
of fees has been rapidly increasing in California. One of the causes was
the tax limitation initiative, Proposition 13. A survey of San Francisco
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Bay Area communities by Gabriel, Katz, and Wolch found that three fourths
of the cities in the survey increased their fees. in response to Proposi-
tion 13. Fees increased 70% between 1976 and 1980, rising from an average
of $1121 per unit to $1907 per unit. (1)
Proposition 13 did three things which encouraged development fee increases:
1) Proposition 13 reduced property tax rates, which cut local government
revenues; 2) Proposition 13 made it very difficult for California
communities to finance capital expenditures through the issuance of bonds;
3) Proposition 13 made, in the eyes of many local officials, new develop-
ment into a big fiscal loser.
In California's June primary of 1978, Proposition 13 was overwhelming-
ly approved by 65% of the states voters. Tax relief was what they wanted
and tax relief was what they got. Property taxes were reduced from an
average of 3% of a parcel's market value to 1% and assessment increases
were limited to 2% per year. Increasing fees was one course of action
available to public officials. Raising development fees (which are borne
by new home buyers) has its political advantages as noted in a Gruen and
Gruen study, Proposition 11 and The Future of Construction In California:
(1) Stuart Gabriel, Lawrence Katz, and Jennifer Wolch, "Local Land Use
Regulation and Proposition 13: Some Findings From A Recent Survey",
Program in Real Estate and Urban Economics, Working Paper Series, No.
80-4, (Berkeley: Institute of Business and Economic Research, Univer-
sity of California at Berkeley, 1980.)
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by far the fastest and largest increases in fees and charges
that have been levied since Proposition 13 are those imposed on
new construction. Hard pressed supervisors, councilmembers, and
district boards would be less than human if they did not recog-
nize that it is easier to raise the charges on those not yet
within their jurisdiction than it is to increase the fees of
their present constituents.(1)
The tax limitation provisions of Proposition 13 have effectively
eliminated general-obligation bonds as a method of capital facilities
financing in California. The ability of a city to raise its property tax
if additional revenues are needed to meet bond payments is the ultimate
security behind general-obligation bonds, Proposition 13's 1% tax rate lid
eliminated that security. Development fees are one way a city can immedi-
ately obtain the funds it needs to finance the services needed for new
units.
Prior to Proposition 13 the net fiscal impact of new housing had been
the subject of some debate, but many public officials became convinced that
new housing was a net fiscal loser after the passage of the proposition. A
report prepared by the State of California's Office of Planning and
Research, New Housing: Paying Its Way! looked at 10 post-Prop 13 fiscal
impact studies.(2) All of the studies concluded that new residential con-
struction would cost municipalities more money for services than they would
bring in property taxes. One fiscal impact statement for a residential
project in Anaheim estimated that a project with 521 single family units
(1) Gruen Gruen + Associates, "Proposition 13 And the Future of Construc-
tion In California," photocopy, n.d.
(2) California Office of Planning and Research (OPR), New Housing Paying
Its Way, (Sacramento: OPR, May 1979).
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and 379 multi-family units would produce a net revenue loss of $16-35 mil-
lion dollars over 10 years.(1) The OPR study was heavily criticized by the
construction industry, but many communities took notice. The dramatic
increase in development fees could be interpreted as an effort by
communities to make up part of a perceived revenue loss on new development.
That communities are imposing fees in order that new development
should "pay its own way" is supported by an Association of Bay Area Govern-
ments (ABAG) study, Development Fees In The San Francisco Bay Area, which
found that fast growing communities in the fringe areas of the San
Francisco Bay Area levied much higher development fees than did slow
growing core cities.(2)
The study divided the Bay Area into three zones (See Figure 3).
Communities in Zone 1, the built up core area of the Bay Area where rela-
tively little growth is taking place, impose relatively low development
fees averaging $1619 in 1981. Just outside of the built up core are the
communities of Zone 2 in which infill growth is occuring. Zone 2
communities averaged $3532 in development fees in 1981. Zone 3 jurisdic-
tions, which include Livermore, are the fast growing communities located in
the outlying portions of the Bay Area. These communities with their need
for additional infrastructure to accommodated growth, average $6,194 in
development fees for 1981.
(1) California Office of Planing and Research, New Housing Paying Its Way,
p 7.
(2) Association of Bay Area Governments, Development Fees In The San
Francisco Bay Area, An Update, (Berkeley, January 1982).
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Figure 4, from the ABAG study, offers a breakdown of development fees
for the three zones. Planning fees are those charged for regulatory
actions such as zoning changes and establishment of PUDs. Building fees
and those charged by building departments; utility fees and growth-impact
fees are those designed to make growth pay its way. Most of the difference
in fee totals was attributed to the higher utility and growth impact fees
in the faster growing communities. Average building fees were very similar
for all three zones. Utility fees accounted for approximately one-half of
the fee charges in all three zones, though they were numerically higher in
the faster growing communities, increasing three and one-half times between
Zone 1 and Zone 3. There are dramatic differences between growth fees
among the three zones, with fees rising from an average of $105 a unit in
Zone 1 to $2526 a unit in Zone 3. ABAG concluded that the high development
fees in outlying areas are being used to finance the infrastructure
requirements of growth: parks, schools sewer systems, water facilities,
etc.
ABAG also noted that fees were not only higher, but were growing at a
higher rate in the fast growing communities. This was attributed to the
effects of Proposition 13. With their need for new services to meet the
needs of growth, the fast growing communities were hit harder by Proposi-
tion 13.
LIVERMORE CASE STUDY
The City of Livermore has relied upon development fees to meet the
costs of growth since the early 1960's. Development fees are collected
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from home builders at the time a building permit is issued. By collecting
upfront fees the City of Livermore has been able to finance the public ser-
vices required for new growth without the use of bonded debt.
Table 5 lists Livermore development fees paid for a home in Tract A of
the Suburban Homes development in 1964 and for a typical single family home
constructed in 1981. A description of each fee, how the rate is set, and
what the fee is used for, is given is Appendix B. Fees are quite similar
for different sized units since most fees are assessed on a per unit basis.
Engineering fees are assessed to pay for checking of development proposals
and finished subdivision improvements by the Public Works staff. Planning
fees were not included since they vary considerably from project to project
and are difficult to determine for past years. However, planning fees make
up a very small fraction of Livermore's fees. (1)
Building fees are included to cover the cost of checking construction plans
and site inspection of homes. Growth fees are used to pay for the public
improvements necessitated by new home construction.
One of Livermore's growth fees was omitted from Table 5. The private-
ly owned California Water Service Company provides water to 80% of
Livermore's families.(2) The City of Livermore provides water to the
remaining 20%. Developers building units within the city's water service
(1) ABAG estimated in its 1981 study of development fees that planning fees
accounted for less than 15 of Livermore's total. ABAG, Development
Fees In The San Francisco Bay Area, An Update.
(2) City of Livermore, Livermore Community General Plan 1976-2000,
(Livermore, 1981) p 73.
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TABLE 5
PER UNIT DEVELOPMENT FEES
FEES 1965 1981 Change
ENGINEERING $21 $337 1505%
Map Fees $1 $55
Inspection For Public Works $20 $282
BUILDING
Building Fees $160 $854 434%
UTILITY $438 $3199 630%
Storm Drainage Fee (City) $168 $329
Storm Drainage Fee (County) $120 $120
Sanitary Sewer Hookup Charge $150 $1920
County Water Connection Charge * $830
GROWTH IMPACT $182 $3374 1754%
In-Lieu Park Fee $107 $646
Annexation Fee $75 *
In-Lieu Low Income Housing Fee $442
Tax On Residential Construction $1715
TOTAL $801 $7764 869%
* Fee does not exist at this time.
area paid a $461 water storage fee in 1981. Since a majority of Livermore
homes, including the Suburban Homes development, were not affected by the
water storage fee, it was omitted from the analysis.
If the aforementioned fees seem well above average to the reader it is
because they are among the highest in the nation. The previously mentioned
Gabriel, Katz, and Wolch study of California development fees found that
out of 64 communities surveyed, Livermore had the highest development fees
in both 1976 and 1979.(1) The ABAG study confirmed Livermore as the San
(1) Stuart Gabriel, Lawrence Katz, and Jennifer Wolch, "Local Land Use
Regulation and Proposition 13: Some Findings From A Recent Survey". p
7.
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Francisco Bay Area development fee leader for 1979. (1) But the ABAG study
also found that Livermore fell to second place, passed by a fee happy
Tiburon in 1981.
The fees charged to each unit of Tract A in 1964 were $811 or 4.2% of
the sales price of the least expensive home in Tract A (Table 6) . Since
most of Livermore's fees were levied on a per unit basis they were the same
for the large and small houses in Tract A. Fees made up 4.2% of the price
of the most expensive unit in Tract A.
TABLE 6
DEVELOPMENT FEES AS A PERCENT OF HOME PRICE
LIVERMORE TRACT A
Most Expensive Home 1966
Sale Price $22,550 100%
Total Fee Cost $972 4.3%
Fees $801 3.6%
Add-Ons (21.4%) $171 0.9%
Least Expensive Home 1965
Sale Price $18,950 100%
Total Fee Cost $972 5.1%
Fees $801 4.2%
Ad-Ons $171 0.9%
Median Price Home 1981
Sale Price $96,000 100%
Total Fee Cost $9,425 9.8%
Fees $7,764 8.1%
Ad-Ons (21.4%) $1,661 1.7%
Many developers use cost-plus pricing in which initial sales prices
are determined by adding a profit and overhead rate to production costs.
(1) Association of Bay Area Governments, Development Fees In The San
Francisco Bay Area, An Update, pp. 110-112.
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The developer of Suburban Homes stated that he, and most other developers,
treat fees as any other cost to which overhead, sales costs, and profit are
added. These add-ons were equal to 21.3% of the construction cost of a
unit in Suburban Homes. In Table 6, add-ons are summed with fees to indi-
cate the total cost of fees to the consumer if we assume all costs are
passed forward.
As we can see in Table 6, development fees have increased almost ten
fold since 1966. Fees have risen faster than home prices, between 1966 and
1981 Livermore's development fees as a percent of home price has almost
doubled. Total development fees have grown because of inflation in the
cost of providing services, higher service levels, and the addition of new
fees over time.
Livermore's first development fees were the storm drainage fees, the
sewer connection fee, and the engineering fees which were instituted in
1958. Initially the fees were raised whenever the city council decided
that higher fees were needed, but this procedure was always accompanied by
howls of protest from the development community. It was later decided to
tie fees to construction cost indexes and re-adjust them annually. The
Public Works Director for Livermore finds the current method of raising
fees superior as it places the city on a "much more businesslike basis as
far as fees are concerned".(1) Over time new fees were added. The in-lieu
park fee was added in the 1960's; the county water connection charge, the
(1) Interview with Daniel Lee, Public Works Director for the City of
Livermore, January 21, 1982.
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school fee, and the tax on residential construction were added in the early
1970's; and the in-lieu low income housing fee was added in 1980. In addi-
tion to new fees, 1981 new homebuyers are also paying for higher levels of
service. Inflation and Federal requirements for higher levels of treatment
have caused sewer connection fees to jump from $150 in 1958 to $2,045 in
1982. The in-lieu park fee, which is based on the cost of land and
improvement costs, increased from $107 in 1966 to $726 in 1982 in part due
to the doubling of the park dedication requirement from 1 to 2 acres per
100 units.
Paying for the costs of growth was a prime motivation behind
Livermore's adoption of its present fee structure. The basic rationale
behind all of Livermore's development fees is expressed in an explanation
of the sewer connection fee, taken from a report by the Director of Public
Works for Livermore:
The philosophy which prompted the original Livermore sewer
connection fee was that "growth should pay its own way". Each
new customer connecting to the sewerage system should pay his
fair share of the cost of the existing and future sewerage system
necessary to serve that customer. By doing so monies will be
available as expansion of the system are needed. Also the gener-
al public will not be asked to approve, and pay for, recurring
bond issues that are made necessary by others. The purpose of
the one-time sewer connection fee is to pay for capital improve-
ments to the sewerage system, unlike the sewer service charge
which is a continuing monthly charge which is used principally to
defray the cost of maintenance and operation of the completed
system, but which can also be used for capital improvements (City
Code Sec. 19.77).(1)
(1) Dan Lee, "Revenue Program For Sanitary Sewer Connection Fees And
Service Charges", Livermore, California, December 27, 1976. (photo-
copy), p.4.
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Apparently they have been quite successful in implementing this
fee philosophy. Livermore's only bond issues in the last 25 years
have been a 1958 sewer bond issue and a 1965 library bond issue, both
of which were paid off in 1978.(1) Daniel Lee, the Public Works
Director feels that the fees do not cover all of the costs of new
development, but that they come close. The major capital expense
related to new development which was not covered by a development fee
is the cost of new roads.(2) Livermore's share of receipts from the
gasoline tax are not considered adequate by Mr. Lee to finance the
new road requirements of growth.(3) A new major road fee which would
pay for new major streets and the widening of existing streets was
considered in 1974, but has not yet been adopted. (4)
Through its utility fees Livermore is asking new residents to pay
for the new services which they will require. The utility fees, by
and large, are based on the cost of the new capital investments that
are required to meet the needs of new residents. But in a few
instances, new residents are also paying for benefits that existing
(1) City of Livermore,"Annual Budget 1981-1982". (Livermore, 1981) p. ix.
(2) Specifically, the cost of new roads of greater size than a collector
are borne by the city. Developers are responsible for providing
secondary roads and collectors within their tracts.
(3) In real terms the receipts from the California gasoline tax have been
declining due to inflation. The gasoline tax is a flat charge per
gallon rather than an ad velorum tax and has not been raised in some
years.
(4) Daniel Lee, "Utility Undergrounding Costs, Major Street Fee", (City of
Livermore interoffice Memorandum: from: Public Works Director; to:
City Manager, City Council; June 14, 1974).
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residents receive. Recent drainage improvements in some older areas
of town, built before the storm drainage fee was instituted, are paid
for with storm drainage fees from new home owners. The rationale is
that everyone benefits from an adequate storm drainage system. The
fees from older homes paid for secondary sewage treatment facilities,
new residents are paying fees for tertiary treatment now required in
Livermore, but all residents use the higher level of treatment.
During the 1970's, Livermore asked new residents to take on new
fee burdens, some of which were intended for the benefit of the gener-
al public. The in-lieu low income housing fee and the tax on residen-
tial construction are two fees which clearly are used to benefit the
entire population of Livermore and appear to be unrelated to the
infrastructure needs of new growth. The in-lieu low income housing
fee is used for construction of low-income housing. Provision of low
income housing benefits the entire community and is an expense which
would be difficult to blame on new housing. Sixty percent of receipts
from the tax on residential construction are applied to general reve-
nues and the remaining forty percent are transferred to the park dis-
trict. While this tax is justified as paying for the "other" growth
expenses not covered by other fees, its benefits are spread out among
all Livermore residents.
Conclusion
Livermore's development fees have increased rapidly over the
years and now make up a substantial portion of the price of a new
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home. The fees have increased at a much higher rate than general home
prices and appear to be making a contribution to the rapid rate of
home price inflation. Livermore has made more extensive use of fees
than any other California community, but Proposition 13 is forcing
other communities to follow their example. If development fees of the
magnitude of Livermore's become widespread they could further erode
the ability of American's to purchase their own homes.
Through its fees, Livermore is asking new residents to both pay
for their services and pay for benefits which accrue to the general
public. A number of new fees were adopted in the early 1970's, at a
time when anti-growth sentiment in Livermore was high. The park dedi-
cation requirement was also doubled at this time. Perhaps the
anti-growth Livermore City Council was using fees to discourage growth
as well as to make growth "pay its own way."
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CHAPTER IV
SUBDIVISION POLICIES AND THE COST OF HOUSING
In the previous chapters Livermore's subdivision regulations were
examined to verify or deny criticisms of subdivision policy. The important
result of any policy critique is a recommendation for policy change. The
basis of the criticisms was a concern over the ability of first time
homebuyers to enter the housing market. The question addressed in this
chapter is, how much could subdivision policy changes have affected the
affordability of new housing in Livermore? The measure of affordability
used here is the annual income needed to purchase a new home. The subdivi-
sion policy changes tested are elimination of excessive subdivision
improvement standards, financing of services with municipal bonds, and
paying for services with property taxes.
To test these policy changes, three scenarios were constructed. In
each scenario changes in Livermore's subdivision policy were assumed and an
estimate of the policy changes impact on the affordability of new housing
was made. All scenarios assume that any potential savings are passed for-
ward to consumers. The scenarios are as follows:
SCENARIO ONE. How much more affordable would housing in Livermore
have been if subdivision standards were not as high? The annual
income needed to purchase a home constructed under Livermore's subdi-
vision standards is compared to the income needed to purchase a home
constructed under the less expensive Substitute Standards from Chapter
11.
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SCENARIO TWO. New homebuyers in Livermore finance subdivision
improvements, and the development fees paid on their units, with home
mortgages. Interest rates paid on home mortgages are higher than
those paid on municipal bonds. How much less expensive would it have
been to finance fees and improvements with municipal bonds? In this
scenario it is assumed that Livermore does not charge development fees
and the city installs subdivision improvements. Municipal bonds are
issued in an amount equaling the fees which would have been collected
and the cost of subdivison improvements. An assessment district for
each subdivision is formed to pay for the bonds with each homeowner
making equal payments. Through the use of an imaginary assessment
district the cost of bond financing is compared to the cost of mort-
gage financing.
SCENARIO THREE. In this scenario the more traditional method of
financing services with property taxes is compared with Livermore's
more modern practice of financing new services with exactions and
development fees. The scenario examines the redistributive effect of
the property tax. It is assumed that Livermore has never charged
development fees and that all subdivision improvements have been
installed by the city. Again the cost of subdivision improvements and
the expenditures financed by fees are paid for with municipal bonds.
But in this scenario, property taxes levied on the entire Livermore
tax base are used to make bond payments. The pertinent question is
how much does the current trend of shifting service costs from the
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public sector to the private sector increase the burden of new
homebuyers and relieve the burden of existing homebuyers.
In the remainder of this chapter a discussion of the problem of hous-
ing affordability will be presented, to be followed by the results of the
three scenarios and concluding statements.
THE PROBLEM OF HOUSING AFFORDABILITY
That home prices have risen much faster than family income over the
last decade has been well documented in both the academic and popular
press. That the problem is very extreme in California is also well known.
An often cited statistic is that with high home prices in California and
the current high interest rates, only 5% of that states families can afford
to buy a new home. The lucky 5% are those with sufficient incomes to qual-
ify for a mortgage, with the minimum down payment, on that much discussed
dwelling unit, the median priced home.
However, the above statement assumes that all prospective home buyers
only have sufficient capital for the minimum down payment. The number of
Californians unable to purchase the median priced home is somewhat less
than 95%. Millions of California residents who owned homes during the dec-
ade of home price inflation accumulated huge amounts of equity. For these
Californians no tears need be shed. Their home equity will overcome most
income barriers should they decide to trade up or move to a new location.
It is the somewhat smaller subset of the population, the first time home
buyer, that has been largely excluded from the market by inflation and
interest rates. This author has not seen an estimate of how many
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California families fit in either category, but a substantial portion of
prospective homebuyers do not currently own homes. A recent survey of 1000
prospective buyers at 33 new-home developments in Southern California found
that 52% were renting houses or apartments. The median income of these
shoppers was $40,490 for those shopping for detached homes and $22,500 for
those shopping for attached homes. (1)
In 1970 a family with an income of $8600 a year and $4700 for a down
payment could purchase the median priced ($23,400) Livermore home. In
1981, a family must have an income of $55,906 to purchase the Livermore
median priced home ($96,000).
SCENARIO ONE
In Scenario One we find out how much difference a policy decision to
reduce subdivision improvement standards would have had on the
affordability of housing in Livermore. In Chapter II the potential con-
struction cost saving.s which could have been achieved with less expensive
standards was estimated to be $1561 for a new unit sold in 1966 and $9322
for a unit in 1981 (Table 3).
If construction cost savings were passed on to new home buyers; home
prices, mortgage payments, and the income needed to purchase a home would
be less. Table 7 compares the cost of home ownership for a unit built to
Livermore's standards and the cost of a unit built to the Substitute Stan-
dards from Chapter 11. Home mortgage interest rates and terms were
(1) Lauren Tsujimoto, "House Shoppers Exhibit A New Profile." Boston
Globe, May 2, 1982
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TABLE 7
SCENARIO ONE
REDUCE SUBDIVISION STANDARDS
1966 1981
HOMEPRICE WITH $18,950 $96,000
LIVERMORE STANDARDS
Annual mortgage payment $1,091 $12,765
Down payment $3,790 $19,200
Income needed $6,448 $55,906
HOME PRICE WITH $17,383 $86,678
SUBSTITUTE STANDARDS
Annual Mortgage Payment $1,001 $11,525
Down payment $3,478 $17,336
Income needed $6,088 $50,944
DIFFERENCE
Annual mortgage payment $90 $1,240
Down payment $312 $1,864
Income needed $360 $4,962
Potential Cost Savings With Substitute Standards: 1966($1,561),
1981($9,322)
Mortgage Interest Rates: 1966(6%O, 1981(16.5%)
Mortgage terms: 80% for 30 years.
Property Tax: 1966($521), 1981($1211)
Income needed = 4 x (Property tax + Annual mortgage payment)
Home price: 1966(lowest price unit in Tract A), 1981(Livermore median home
price)
obtained from the Bank of America in Livermore.(1) The Bank of America
requires that mortgage borrowers have an income which is 4 times the annual
cost of mortgage and property tax payments.
In Table 7, we see that with lower standards the purchase price of the
lowest priced Suburban Homes unit (1966) could have been reduced to
(1) Telephone interview with Dan Bello of BAnk of America, Livermore
Branch. March 8,1982.
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$17,383. However, when the $1561 savings is spread out over 30 years of
mortgage payments it becomes quite small. In 1966, a decision to reduce
subdivision standards would have only reduced the annual mortgage payment
by $90.
In 1981 home price inflation increases the potential savings to $9322,
and the potential reduction in annual mortgage payments to $1,240. A 1981
decision to lower standards would reduce the income needed to purchase the
median priced Livermore home by $4,962. How much is this cost difference
an artifact of the high home mortgage rates of 1981 (16.5%). If we assume
a home mortgage rate of 10% for 1981 a policy of reducing subdivision
improvement standards could still lower annual mortgage payments by
$786.(1)
Though the 1981 impact of a reduction in standards is significant,
lower subdivision standards would not dramatically change the class of per-
sons who can afford to purchase a Livermore home. With lower subdivision
standards, it would still take an income of $48,884 to qualify for a mort-
gage on 1981 median priced Livermore home.
SCENARIO TWO
In Scenario Two the policy recommendation that all services for new
developments be provided by local government and financed through the use
of special assessments is tested. It is assumed that an assessment dis-
(1) A $96,000 home purchased with an 80% 30 year mortgage at 10% interest
requires annual mortgage payments of $8,088. A $86,678 home requires a
$7,302 annual mortgage payment.
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trict is created for Suburban Homes and issues bonds equal to the amount of
fees paid plus the cost of subdivision improvements.(1) The special
assessment district could provide services at a lower cost, since they
would be financed with municipal bonds which carry a lower interest rate
than mortgages.
In Table 8 the cost of home ownership with an assessment district is
compared to the cost of home ownership under the present situation in
Livermore. It is apparent from Table 8 that the difference between munici-
pal and mortgage interest does not have a great impact on affordability.
For the 1981 median priced home, assessment district financing could poten-
tially lower the sale price by $5,553 and reduce annual mortgage payments
another $1600. But the payment to the assessment district would be $1,266
annually, negating most of the savings. The impact of assessment district
in 1966 is even smaller.
It is reasonable to conclude that taking advantage of the lower inter-
est rates available to government borrowers to finance services would not
greatly reduce the annual cost of home ownership. But it does appear to
reduce the down payment requirment by a small, but significant amount. In
Table 8, financing services with assessments reduces the down payment
(1) For the analysis is Scenario Two only growth impact fees and utility
fees are considered, and engineering and building fees have been
ommitted from the analysis. Building and engineering fees were omitted
in order that the analysis in Scenario Two can be compared with an
analysis in Scenario Three for which engineering and building fee data
were absent. These fees are only a small percent of development fee
totals (see Chap 111).
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TABLE 8
SCENARIO TWO
FINANCING SERVICES WITH ASSESSMENTS
1966
Mortgage interest rate
Municipal bond rate
Utility and Growth Fees
Subdivision improvements
FINANCING SERVICES
Home price
mortgage payment
Base tax payment
Total Annual Cost
Income required
Down payment
FINANCING SERVICES
Home price
Mortgage payment
Tax payment
Assessment*
Total annual cost
Income required
Down payment
DIFFERENCE
Home price
Mortgage payment
Tax payment
Total Annual Cosi
Income required
Down payment
WITH HOME
6.0%
3.3%
$620
$1,088
MORTGAGE
$18,950
$1,091
$521
$1,612
$6,448
$3,790
WITH ASSESSMENTS
$17,242
$992
$606
$85
$1,598
$6,392
$3,448
$1,708
$99
-$85
$14
$56
$342
* Assessments calculated assuming a bond is used to finance fees and subdi-
vision improvements. The bond payments are composed of interest payment at
the prevailing rate when the bond was issued plus payments to a sinking
fund to pay off the bond at maturity. The sinking fund is invested at the
prevailing interest rate for long term Federal securities (1966 - 4.27%,
1981 - 12.9%).
required on a median priced home from $19,200 to $16,775, not a dramatic
drop but still a contribution.
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1981
16.5%
10.1%
$6,573
$5,553
$96,000
$12,765
$1,211
$13,976
$55,904
$19,200
$83,874
$11,153
$2,477
$1,266
$13,630
$54,520
$16,775
$12,126
$1,612
-$1,266
$346
$1,384$2,425
TABLE 9
SCENARIO TWO
DEVELOPER ADD-ONS
1966 1981
Utility and Growth Fees $620 $6,573
Subdivision Improvements,' $1,088 $5,553
Add-Ons(21.4%) $366 $2,595
Annual Mortgage Payments
for Add-Ons $21 $149
Down Payment for Add-Ons $73 $519
When developers pay development fees and install subdivision improve-
ments, they treat these as any other construction cost. Many developers
initially price their units on a cost-plus basis, adding a percentage mark
up to cover profit, overhead, sales costs, financing costs, and closing
costs to their construction cost. In the Suburban Homes development, these
add-ons amounted to 21.4% of construction costs. One criticism of local
governments shifting service costs to the private sector is that if those
services were provided by the municipal goverment through an assessment
district, the developer add-ons would be eliminated. However it is not
clear that cities can provide public improvements as cheaply as a develop-
er. City government also has overhead costs and local government
contracting procedures do not always allow the bargining power that devel-
opers have in dealing with contractors. Table 9 presents the annual mort-
gage payments required to pay for developer add-ons for fees and subdivi-
sion improvements. The potential savings here are not large.
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Overall it would appear that provision of services through assessment
districts does not hold great potential for reducing home prices in
Livermore.
SCENARIO THREE
In this scenario we pose the question, what if Livermore had never
shifted any public service costs to developers and instead had financed all
services through property taxes? In comparing fees and exactions to prop-
erty taxes, the difference is not one of how much the services will cost,
but who will pay for them. They are two different systems of taxation and
are based on very different philosophies regarding who should pay for ser-
vices. Fees and exactions are a one-time-only charge for building in a
community. The amount of tax is based somewhat loosely on the concept that
people should pay for what they use. Property taxes are a wealth tax and
reflect a belief that people should pay according to their abilities, not
their needs.
Property taxes are a progressive tax instrument which redistributes
income in a number of ways. Though most homeowners probably make much the
same use of sewers or sidewalks, owners of expensive homes pay much more
property tax than do owners of modest homes. Residential property owners
are also subsidized through the property system by commercial
and industrial properties which pay much tax but use few ser,
v ices, l
(1) A good example of a community where residential properties are heavly
subsidized by nonresidential property owners is the City of Palo Alto,
California. Residential properties account for only 35% of the local
school districts property tax revenues with the remained supplied by
commercial and industrial properties. See Bernard Frieden, "Allocating
the public Service Costs of New Housing", Urban Land, Vol. 39 No. 1
(January, 1980), p.16.
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The redistributive aspects of the property tax system are not present
in Livermore's development fees. Most of Livermore's development fees are
levied on a per unit basis with modest homes paying much the same fees as
more expensive homes. Building fees and the tax on residential construc-
tion are based on the construction cost of a home, while engineering fees
are based on the cost of subdivision improvements (which will be a function
of lot front footage). But the storm drainage, sewer connection, water
connection, park, school, and low income housing fees are the same for all
size houses (see Appendix B).(1) The Livermore system is very much based
on the "pay for what you use" philosophy. Most communities encourage busi-
ness development so that taxes from business properties will take up some
of the burden of providing services to residences. In, Livermore, new home
owners are asked to contribute to low income housing and other services
which they will not directly use, but commercial development is exempt from
these fees. Commercial and industrial developments in Livermore pay utili-
ty fees based on use, but do not pay park fees, school fees, low income
housing fees, or the tax on residential construction (See Appendix B for
more details on fees). The pros and cons of using progressive taxation
methods to provide public services, and to what extent nonresidential
(1) Apartments pay lower utility hook-up fees, but the same school, park,
and low income housing fees as do single family homes.
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properties should share in the cost of
debated here. It is sufficient to say
the use of fees eliminates a number of
residential services will not be
that as opposed to property taxes,
subsidies.
Returning to the question at hand, what would have happened if
Livermore had instead chosen to finance those expenditure for which fees
are now used, and subdivision improvements, with bonds that were paid for
with property tax revenues. The answers are on Table 10. See Appendix C
for details on methods used to calculate results in Table 10.
TABLE 10
TAX IMPACT OF ELIMINATING RESIDENTIAL
FEES AND EXACTIONS IN LIVERMORE
Fees Collected 1959-1981* $14,700,000
Subdivision Improvement Bonds
Posted 1950-1981 $18,600,000
Annual Cost of Bonds For Fees $894,381
Annual Cost Of Bonds For Improvements $1,095,792
1981 Livermore Property Tax Base** $1,007,925,364
1981 Tax Rate** 1.3595%
Additional Tax For Fee Bonds .0887%
Additional Tax For Improvement Bonds .1087%
Total .1974%
For method of calculation see Appendix C
* Growth-impact and Utility Fees
** Source: Alameda County Assessors Office and Auditor/Controller
An estimated 14 million dollars in utility and growth-impact fees have
been collected from developers of single family and multi-family housing
developers since fees were imposed in 1958.(1) Developers of single family
(1) These fees were paid on approximately 12,000 units or 75% of
Livermore 's total housing stock (16,000 units) . Only growth-impact and
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houses have put up guarantee bonds for subdivision improvements totaling
almost $19,000,000 since 1950.(2) If municipal bonds had been issued each
year to pay for those expenditures which were covered by fees and for sub-
division improvements, by 1981 the annual cost of interest and sinking fund
payments for those bonds would raise the property tax rate by about 15%.
In Table 11 we see how this tax increase would affect Livermore
homeowners. The property tax increase resulting from Scenario Three is in
the hundreds of dollars while potential mortgage payment reductions are in
the thousands of dollars per year. The purchaser of a median priced new
home in 1981 would save $1612 on mortgage payments if the developer passed
along all savings from elimination of fee and subdivision improvement
TABLE 11
IMPACT OF SCENARIO THREE
ON LIVERMORE TAX PAYERS
Annual Mortgage Additional
Payment Reduction Property Tax
Purchaser Of $96,000
Home In 1981 $1612 $176
Purchaser of $200,000
Home In 1981 $2,088 $381
Purchaser of $18,950 Home
In 1966 now assessed at
$85,000 $99 $154
For method of calculation see Appendix C
costs, but only face $176 in additional propety taxes.
The numbers in Table 11 indicate that a substantial redistribution of
(1) These fees were paid on approximately 12,000 units or 75% of Livermore's
total housing stock (16,000 units). Only growth-impact and utility fees
were included since sufficient data on engineering and building fees for
past years was not available.
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costs could take place with Scenario Three. It is doubtful that residents
are subsidized by nonresidential properties to a great extent in Livermore
since residential property makes up 79% of Livermore's property tax
base.(1) In relative terms purchasers of a $200,000 homes do not make out
as well as purchasers of $96,00 homes, but in absolute terms they do better
with Scenario Three. What happens under Scenario Three is that 1981 new
home buyers make out like bandits, but some one who purchased a home in
1966 faces a property tax increase which is slightly higher than what he
would save on payments for a 1966 mortgage. Under Scenario Three 1981 new
home buyers face large reductions in the cost of home ownership, while long
time residents face slightly higher home ownership costs.
How is it possible to have such a large gain for new home buyers with
such a small loss for existing residents? The results of the analysis in
Table 11 are artifacts of three forces: inflation, growth control, and
rising fees. Because of growth control the number of new houses
constructed in Livermore over the last 5 years is quite small compared to
the existing stock (See Table 1C Annendix C). With Scenario Three the
serivce costs of new units are spread out over a large tax base. When a
home is new the cost of fees and subdivision improvements makes up a sig-
nificant portion of its purchase price. But with rapid inflation the orig-
inal cost of fees and improvements becomes an increasingly small portion of
current home price. In the long run in an inflationary economy, a home
buyer is probably better off financing services with an assessment district
(1) Telephone interview, Alameda County Assessors Office, April 15, 1982.
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whose charges remain constant, than through property taxes which increase
with inflation.
The conclusion that we can draw from Scenario Three is that where new
growth is small and inflation is great, the costs of ownership for new home
buyers can be reduced a great deal, at a small cost to existing residents
by paying for most services with property taxes.
CONCLUSION
With the three scenarios, three subdivision policy recommendations
have been tested using Livermore as the model. None of the policy recom-
mendations would make Livermores homes suddenly affordable to persons of
moderate means. But a house is made of many bricks and subdivision
policies are part of a large body of government actions which affect the
price of housing.
Reducing subdivision standards has the potential for a significant
level of savings while assessment districts do not. I might underscore
that for 1981 there was an unusually large spread between mortgage and
muniipal bond rates (almost 6%, whereas in most years the interest rate
spread is around 3%), but the interest rate differences possible with an
assessment district did not seem to affect the affordability of housing
much.
Shifting service costs back to the public sector and paying for them
with property taxes is the least feasible, politically, of any of the poli-
cy recommendations. But the analysis did point out that in a
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growth-control community like Livermore, raising fees can have a large
effect on new home buyer while providing rather modest tax relief for
existing home owners.
For example let us assume the two fees which charge new home buyers
for what would seem to be general public expenses, the residential con-
struction tax and the in-lieu low income housing fee. If the maximum num-
ber of units (300) were constructed in one year they would pay (assuming
all are median priced homes at $96,000) $647,400 in low income and residen-
tial construction tax fees. Each new home buyer faces additional mortgage
payment of $24 as year and an additional down payment of $431. Had these
funds been financed with municipal bonds and paid with property taxes,
Livermore home owners (of $96,000 units) would each face an additional
$6.40 a year in propety taxes. If fees are used to hold down property
taxes in a city like Livermore, it really has to load costs onto new home
buyers to have much of an effect on existing residents' tax rates.
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CHAPTER V CONCLUSIONS
This and other studies of local government regulation and housing
costs have focused on regulatory changes which reduce the costs of
constructing a home. The studies were motivated out of a concern for
potential home buyers who are being priced out of the market. The
assumption is that developers pass all cost increases on to home buyers.
However, the popular wisdom that sellers always pass on cost increases to
buyers is not consistently embraced by economists. Many economists feel
that regulations which increase the cost of home construction can in many
cases result in lower prices being paid for land rather than higher home
prices. Who pays the cost of subdivision standards and development fee
increases is a question of vital importance for this study. If all costs
are indeed passed back to land owners, then there is little point to this
study since most planners, myself included, are not overly concerned with
the capital gains of land owners.
Though the question of fee incidence is crucial in any discussion of
the desirability of development fees, as noted by Dean Misczynski there
is little consensus:
Since fees are rapidly becoming a highly important source of
infrastructure financing, it would be nice to know something of
their incidence. Unfortunately, reasoned dialogue on this
question is largely nonexistant. Builders unanimously proclaim
that they pass fees on to home buyers. Academic economists are
inclined to believe that at least some of the fees will be
"passed backwards" to landowners. Among public officials, the
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builders view holds sway. A few empirical inquiries into fee
incidence are begining but the statistical difficulties are
ponderous and the resources available very limited. (1)
The results of two empirical studies of home prices in the San
Francisco Bay Area are mixed. Both studies used regression analysis to
explain home prices and included development fees as one of the vari-
ables. One study by David Dowall of the University of California
indicated that fees were being passed on to home buyers virtually intact:
Our results also support the contentions of suburban home
builders who report that planning and development fees are
added to the price of new housing on a one-to-one basis. In
other words, for every one dollar increase in fees, the list
price of a new home increases by one dollar.(2)
However, Lawrence Katz and Kenneth T. Rosen, also of the University
of California, came to opposite conclusions. Their development fee vari-
able was found to be "not statistically significant, indicating that in
our sample development fees on new houses are not reflected in higher
home prices in the community". (3)
(1) Dean J. Misczynski, "Landuse and Proposition 13: The California
Experience", Tax Policy Roudtable Property Tax Papers, No. TPR-6,
(Cambridge: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, undated) p.3.
(2) David E. Dowall, and John D. Landis, "Land-Use Controls And Housing
Costs: An Examination of San Francisco Bay Area Communities,"
Unpublished (photocopy). p. 37.
(3) Lawrence Katz, and Kenneth T. Rosen, "The Effects of Land Use
Controls On Housing Prices", Center For Real Estate And Urban
Ecomonics Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 80-13, (Berkeley:
Institute of Business and Economic Research, University of California
At Berkeley, 1980) p. 47.
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THE ECONOMIST'S VIEW
To the economist, the question of development fee incidence is best
answered by examining consumer's price elasticity of demand for housing.
If a community raises fees then it costs more for a developer to produce
houses and he will attempt to maintain profits by increasing the sale
price of a home. Should consumers have a price inelastic demand for
housing, they will purchase the same number of units at the higher price
and they will have borne the cost of the fee increase. However, if
consumer 's demand for housing is price elastic, they will purchase fewer
homes at the higher price. If the developer wishes to sell the same num-
ber of homes it will be necessary to lower the price of the homes. Some
of the fee increase will then be borne by the developer who will enjoy
fewer profits.
However, in the long run developers will pass any fee costs they
absorb backwards to owners of undeveloped land. Many economists believe
that land prices are the residual in the development equation. Since
developers will not build homes unles they can make a profit, the price
they will offer owners of undeveloped land for their property is equal to
the price at which they can sell houses less profit and the cost of
building homes. Therefore, if costs rise, but the price at which they
can sell homes does not, developers will offer less money for land.
Consumer demand is more price elastic when there are close substi-
tutes for the products they buy. If one community raises fees while its
neighbors do not, housing in neighboring communities will be substituted
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for housing in the community that raised fees. Lower demand forces down
prices to the level of neighboring communities. Therefore, we would
expect that the larger the difference between a community's fees and its
neighbors' fees, the less likely it is that fees will be passed forward
to homebuyers. One might expect then, that since fees vary considerabily
in the Bay Area, the differences in fees between communities would be
capitalized into land prices.
THE DEVELOPER'S VIEW
During the course of interviews with Livermore developers and
Livermore public officials, there was unanimous agreement that developers
pass fees and other cost increases on to home buyers. This opinion was
qualified by the developer of Suburban Homes who felt that in the highly
competitive home market of the early 1960's they had absorbed part of
Livermore's fees in the form of lower profies. He was firm, though, in
his belief that in growth control communities, and Livermore is one,
devvelopers are able to pass along any fees to the home buyer.
The developers with whom I spoke regarding the economist's view of
fee incidence were of the opinion that land markets "aren't perfect mar-
kets" and that they "just don't work the way economist think they do".
They were of the opinion that in California, where demand for housing is
high (or was until the recent surge in interest rates) and development is
restri.cted by extensive regulation, developers easily pass on all fee
costs to home buyers.
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IF THE DEVELOPERS ARE RIGHT
Assuming that the developers are right and the construction costs
which result from subdivision policies are passed through to the new home
buyer, a number of conclusions can be formed from the results of this
study.
Excessive Subdivision Standards
The analysis indicated that the cost of new home ownership could be
diminished if Livermore had less expensive subdivision improvement stan-
dards. New home buyers would benefit in two ways. Subdivision features
which are not valued by consumers and do not significantly enhance their
safety or reduce long term maintenance costs are dead weight. Their
elimination would give home buyers a product which they value the same
but which cost less.
Eliminating or, making less costly, features which do affect a home
buyers perception of home value produces a different product, one which
is less expensive but less valued by consumers. In this case consumers
benefit by having a greater range of options.
One would normally assume that parks and large lots are features
which make homes more valuable in the eyes of consumers. However, the
regression analysis did not indicate a greater willingness to pay for
those features. Perhaps much of the cost of marginally larger lots is a
dead weight cost. A resulting policy recommendation is that cities
should re-examine their subdivision standards and eliminate or reduce
those features which are not really important to health and safety. The
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market should be allowed to set lot sizes and install street trees. Many
stringent subdivision standards were established to prevent the construc-
tion of inexpensive, soon to be blighted subdivisions. I think that
inflation has greatly reduced the probability of that happening.
Inexpensive is probably no longer a realistic adjective for any new hous-
ing.
This kind of reform is not likely to occur at the local level unless
builders are very influential. Existing residents, once they have bought
a new home and are no longer concerned about home price, have little
incentive to go to the aid of less fortunate prospective residents.
Development Fees
The increasing use of fees to finance public services does represent
a change in philosophy for local governments. There have long been
communities which charged fees for sewer connections and established
assessment districts for other services. But charging fees for school
buildings, low income housing, or construction taxes for to be placed in
the general fund are something new. The fees are more regressive than
property taxes, they eliminate subsidies from expensive homes to modest
homes and from commercial and business properties to public services. A
new $96,000 home in Livermore would pay $6,573 in growth-impact and util-
ity fees, while a home more than twice as expensive would pay fees only
25% higher ($8323). It should also be remembered that commercial
properties pay no growth-impact fees under Livermore's system. The fees
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reduce the burden of existing home owners, but at great expense to new
home buyers.
That fees reduce the burden on commercial property owners and
existing home owners adds to similar problems created by Proposition 13.
The tax limitation initiative freezes the growth in property assessments
to 2% a year until resale when property is reassessed at 100% of market
value. Since commercial property,does not change hands as frequently as
does residential property, the commercial share of the property tax bur-
dan declines with time. In Livermore, purchasers of a median priced home
pay taxes on a home assessed at $96,000. A long term Livermore resident
who purchased an identical home before 1976 would be paying taxes based
on a $52,000 assessment.(1) The shifting of tax burden to new home buy-
ers in the form of high fees and exactions is not likely to be abated
soon. Proposition 13 makes few other courses of action fiscally feasible
and the hostility to new residents which spawned many growth control mea-
sures remains.
If fees are to be limited it would be first necessary to establish a
consensus around what share of new service costs new home buyers should
bear, and in doing so balance the interests of existing home owners
against the needs of those now entering the home market. Any limitation
on fees would have to be accompanied by some limits on the steps which
communities can take to control growth. Fees have the effect of reducing
home owner opposition to new growth. Where home owners feel that they
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(1) The median home price in January 1977 was $52,000.
are paying the bills for new development, growth controls can result and
increase the cost of housing by restricting demand.
BUT WHAT IF THE ECONOMISTS ARE RIGHT
To the extent that the costs of subdivision policy can be passed
backwards to developers or land owners, the potential aid that policy
change affords the new home buyer is diminished. If the costs generated
by subdivision policy are not all passed forward to consumers, then we
can conclude that all of the savings generated by policy changes will not
be passed on as well. Who would the true beneficiaries of subdivision
policy reform be?
Excessive Subdivision Standards
If a reduction in subdivision standards results in units being
constructed which are less expensive, but have less value to the home
buyer, the benefits go to the consumer in the form of wider choice. But
if a change in standards eliminates dead weight features which do not
affect the desireability of a unit, the consumer should be willing to pay
the same price for the house. The benefit may then go to the developer
who has a larger profit margin or to the land owner who is able to demand
a higher price for land. It is possible then, that if a community
reduces lot size requirements by a marginal amount, and consumers are
indifferent to the change, the savings will go to the land owner or
developer. This would be the case if only one community within a larger
market reduced its stndards. However if standards were reduced for an
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entire market (a state or a region) with higher profits developers would
build more units, eventually bringing down the price of homes.
Fees
If a single community reduced its fees and if it is part of a larger mar-
ket which sets the price of housing, devlopers and land owners would ben-
efit to some extent from fee reductions. One way in which eliminating
fees could lower home prices is if it resulted in higher property taxes.
Higher taxes would be negatively capitalized into the price of a home.
However, from Chapter IV it is apparent that eliminating fees would only
have a marginal effct on overall property tax rates. One study of tax
capitalization in California found that for every dollar the average
property tax bill declines, the houses in that community increase in
price by 7 dollars.(1)
In Scenario III a $13,126 construction cost reduction was achieved
through elimination of fees and city installation of improvements. But
only a $176 property tax increase resulted. If tax increases are
capitalized to the degree found in the above study, the price of median
priced home in Scenario Three would only decline by $1232. The remaining
$12,894 would be pocketed by the developer or the land owner.
(1) Kenneth T. Rosen, "The Impact of Proposition 13 On House Prices In
Northern California; A Test Of The Interjurisdictional Capitalization
Hypothesis.", Center for Real Estate and Urban Economic Working Paper
Series, Working Paper No. 80-11 Institute of Business and Economic
Research. (University of California Berkeley) 1980.
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If the ecomomists are right, one would first want to establish the
elasticity of demand for housing and for subidivision features, before
embarking on policy changes. One would also want to affect changes on a
large scale throughout entire markets, rather than attempting to influ-
ence the policies of individual communities.
In Summary
The economists and developer's view points are not totally incompat-
ible with respect to possible policy recommendations. If developers are
right, subdivision policy changes on the part of individual communities
would lower home prices. But the probability that city councils will act
to protect the interests of future residents is slight. Proposition 13
also makes any attempt to hold down the growth of fees difficult.
The ecomomists would probably find subdivision policy changes
enacted on a regional or state level more useful than any individual
local actions.
From either view point it will probably take state action if housing
prices are to be reduced through subdivision policies. Perhaps a
California grass roots movement similar to the one started by overtaxed
home owners, will be initiated by the populous baby boomers who have come
knocking at the door to suburbia and found it locked.
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AFTER WORD
This thesis was not just an exercise in academic discipline. The public
policy conflicts which underly the problems addressed in this thesis are
to some extent conflicts that the author finds within himself.
I grew up in California's Santa Clara Valley, now known to most of
the world as Silicon Valley for its semi-conductor industry. When my
family first moved to the valley twenty years ago, it was a land of new
suburban subdivisions nestled among acres of fruit laden orchards. I cLn
remember spring days driving up through the surrounding hills when we
would stop and look down upon the valley floor which was colored with the
soft pink and yellow pastels of the trees new blossoms.
As I grew older the orchards gave way to new subdivisions and the
spring hues were replaced by smog. I really disliked and resented the
bulldozers that tore up the mustard field in which I roamed, even though
the new homes brought more playmates. During the late 1960's community
voices were raised against the growth that changed our home, and mine was
among them. "Limits to growth" and "carrying capacity" were the
buzzwords of the day.
Today as I am completing my graduate studies at MIT my thoughts
begin to turn toward more mature dreams involving career, houses, and
stability. I too would like that small piece of the American dream that
my parents found among the orchards of California. But the little houses
that the World War I1 generation could afford on the GI Bill, are now the
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$120,000 impossible dreams of the 1980's. I want it all, I want the
house and I want the trees. But then we all do, and I suppose that is
the heart of the problem.
86
APPENDIX A
METHOD OF CALCULATING THE COST OF
EXCESSIVE SUBDIVISION IMPROVEMENT STANDARDS
Construction Costs. The installation of street trees, sidewalks, mono-
lithic curbs, and excess requirements for street width and fire hydrants
increased the cost of subdivision improvements for Tract A. A detailed
breakdown of subdivision improvement costs can be found in the "Estimate of
Quantity For Bond" which is on file with the Public Works Department in
Livermore. These estimates of improvement costs are prepared by the devel-
oper for bonding purposes and rechecked by the Public Works staff. When
compared to the cost of actually installing improvements the bond estimates
proved to be quite accurate. The bond estimate for Tract A was prepared in
1964. In order to provide an idea of the current costs of excess subdivi-
sion standards, where applicable estimates are also given in 1981 prices.
The 1981 unit prices for subdivision improvements were obtained from a Bank
of America cost study of subdivision land development in the San Francisco
Area and multiplied by the quantities in the 1964 bond estimate. (1)
The total construction cost of excess standards for Tract A was $65,660 or
$476 per unit.
In Tract A 152 street trees were installed at a total cost of $760, in
1981 installation of street trees for this tract would cost $7,600.
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(1) Bank of America, Cost Study, Subdivision Land Development, San
Francisco Area, January 1981, (San Francisco: Bank of America 1981).
Twelve fire hydrants were installed in Tract A at a cost of $3,300
($19,200 at 1981 prices). Reducing the number of fire hydrants by
one-half would have saved $1,650 ($9,600 at 1981 prices).
A rolled curb and gutter is 30% less expensive than a monolithic curb
and gutter. The total cost of installing monolithic curb and gutter
in Tract A was $19,747 ($75,504 at 1981 prices). The installation of
rolled curbs would have produced a cost savings of $5924 ($22,651 at
1981 prices).
The total cost of grading and paving a 5ft sidewalk on both sides of
the street was $22,321 (1981 cost $112,824)
None of the roads in Tract A are considered collectors. The Tract
consists of a number of loop streets which connect with a major col-
lector just outside of the tract boundary. The cost of installing
40ft streets was $53,882 for grading and paving ($261,772 at 1981
prices). A street with a 26ft paved width has 35% less surface area
than a 40ft street. If 26ft streets had been installed, a cost
savings of $18,858 would have resulted ($91,620 at 1981 prices).
In the Suburban Homes subdivision, the park dedication requirement was
not met on a tract by tract basis. Rather, of the eight tracts
constructed from 1964-1972 two contained park dedications of approxi-
mately 3 acres each. The total of 6 acres of park meet the dedication
requirement for 600 of the 800 units constructed. An in-lieu fee was
paid for the remaining 200 units. Since the eight tracts were built
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over a time period in which inflation of land and building costs
occurred it would have been very difficult to determine how much of
the cost of dedicating land or installing infrastructure for the two
parks should be distributed among the different tracts. However,
since the developer of Suburban Homes chose to meet the park require-
ment with some land dedication and some fee payment it will be assumed
that the fee payment, which was $117 a unit for Tract A is a good
shadow price for park land dedication costs. The park fee is treated
as a construction cost for the analysis to follow. The total cost of
meeting the park standard was $16,146 for 138 units.
TABLE 1A
CONSTRUCTION COST OF EXCESS SUBDIVISION STANDARDS
TRACT A
1964 1981!
Tract PerUnit Tract PerUnit
Street Trees $760 $5.51 $7,600 $55.07
Sidewalks $22,321 $161.75 $112,824 $817.57
Monolithic Curb
Instead of Rolled
Curb $1,650 $11.96 $9,600 $169.57
Excess Street Width $18,859 $136.66 $91,620 $663.91
Park Dedication* $16,146 $117.00 $89,148 $646.00
Total $65,660 $475.81 $333,443 $2,416
* One acre per 100 units 1964, two acres per 100 units 1981.
Land Costs. In addition to material and labor costs, subdivision stan-
dards which require sidewalks, wide streets, and minimum lot widths
increase the cost of producing a home by reducing the density at which
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housing can be constructed. Tract A was constructed at a density of 4.16
units per acre, but if constructed with no sidewalks, lots which were 10ft
narrower, and with 26ft street widths instead of 40ft streets, Tract A
could have been built to a density of 6.08 units per acre.
Tract A was zoned for 6,500 sf lots with a minimum average lot width
of 65ft. If lot widths were reduced 10ft, savings in both land and infra-
structure would result. Lot sizes would be 100 sf smaller (5,500 sf) and
those improvements whose quantities are a function of lot frontage
(streets, sidewalks, utilities, water and sewer lines) could be reduced by
10 linear feet per lot. With smaller lot widths, the 138 units in Tract A
could have been constructed with less land and less infrastructure, or more
units could have been constructed with the same amount of land and infra-
structure. Twenty-five additional units, or a total of 163 units could
have been accommodated on the street frontage in Tract A with 55ft lot
widths.
138 units at 65 ft lot width = 8970 If
163 units at 55 ft lot width = 8970 If
In Tract A 5ft sidewalks on both sides of the street occupy 1.40 acres
of land. The paved area of streets in Tract A is 5.60 acres. If street
widths were reduced from 40 ft to 26 ft, roadways would occupy 3.64 acres,
for a savings of 1.96 acres. Therefore, with no sidewalks and 26 ft
streets, Tract A could have been constructed on 26.79 acres instead of
30.15 acres.
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26.79 acres = 30.15 acres - 1.40 acres sidewalk - 1.96 acres streets
Putting the results of all of the above analyses together, with the
Substitute Standards 163 units could have been constructed on 26.79 acres
in Tract A at a density of 6.08 units per acre. However, 30.15 acres of
land were available for development in Tract A. At a density of 6.08 units
per acre 183 units could have been constructed. The additional 20 units
would be carved out of the 3.36 acres formerly occupied by sidewalks and
excess street width under Livermore standards.
3.36 acres = 1.40 acres sidewalk + 1.96 acres excess street width
20 units = 3.36 acres at 6.08 units per acre
The twenty units carved out of excess sidewalk and street land would
have to be provided with infrastructure, though at a lower cost than was
incurred under Livermore standards.
Total Cost Of Excess Standards
The total cost of excess subdivision standards in Tract A were
estimated by comparing the cost of finished lots in Tract A developed under
Livermore subdivision standards, to the cost of a finished lot under sub-
stitute standards. The cost of a finished lot under substitute standards
was determined by the following method:
Lot cost with Sub Standards = TotRev-Excess+Adlnf/Units
$2714 = $552,000 - $65,660 + $10,378 / 183 units
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TotRev = The total revenue that the developer of Suburban Homes derived
from finished lots in Tract A. The developer's books listed the
value of finished lots at $4,000.
138 lots at $4,000 a finished lot = $552,000
Excess = The construction cost of excess subdivision standards.
$65,660 see Table 1A.
AdInf = The cost of additional infrastructure required for 20 units
carved out of land committed to sidewalks and excess street width
under Livermore standards. The unit cost of additional infra-
structure equals the total cost of providing infrastructure
($150,180) less the construction cost of excess subdivision stan-
dards ($65,660) divided by the total number of units (163) which
can be accommodated with the original infrastructure.
($150,180 - $65,600) / 163 x 20 units =$10,378
Units = Total number of units which can be constructed on Tract A with
substitute standards.
The total cost of excess standards is:
$1286 = Lot cost under Livermore standards ($4,000) less lot
cost with substitute standards ($2714).
The method of calculating the total cost of excess sub-
division standards assumes that the cost savings which
result from higher densities and construction cost savings
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are entirely passed on to home buyers in the form of lower
finished lot cost.
1981 subdivison improvement costs were estimated by updating
Tract A's 1964 bond estimate with current prices supplied by
Bank of America.(1) A 1981 finished lot price of $25,000
estimated by the City of Livermore and the 1981 median sales
price of a-new home in Livermore was used as the sales
price.(2)
(1) Bank of America, Cost Study, Subdivision Land Development, San
Francisco Area, January 1981.
(2) Barbara Hempel, "1970/1980 Comparison Costs of Building A Median
Priced, Single Family Home", City of Livermore Interoffice Memorandum.
From Barbara Hempel to Director of City Planning. August 10, 1981.
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APPENDIX B
DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF DEVELOPMENT FEES
This section will describe each of the growth fees in some detail.
As previously mentioned, engineering and building fees are intended to
pay for staff time to check plans and make on site inspections. The
engineering fees are set as a fraction of the cost of subdivision
improvements, while building fees are roughly a percentage of assessed
value of the home. These fees do not need further elaboration and will
not be further discussed.
Park Fee. The park dedication requirement was originally set at one
acre per hundred lots, but was subsequently changed to two acres per 100
lots. The in-lieu fee for park dedication has risen from $107 in 1966 to
$726 in 1982. Half of the increase is due to the doubling of the dedica-
tion requirement, but the remainder of the cost increase can be
attributed to the rising price of land and construction. The park fee is
calculated by estimating the cost of purchasing land for a two acre park
and constructing 590ft of street frontage improvements. The fee is
adjusted annually by recomputing these costs with current prices for
undeveloped land and with the Engineering News Record construction cost
index.(1) Park fees are used to purchase land for neighborhood parks.
At one time it was required that in-lieu park fees were to be spent in
the same planning district where they were collected. The planning dis-
(1) Daniel Lee, "Park Fee Calculations", (City of Livermore Interoffice
Memorandum; from: Public Works Director; to: City Manager; November
26, 1969).
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trict concept was later -abandoned in Livermore. Since then, there have
been no geographic restrictions on where park fees are spent.
The Quimby Act is an act of the California Legislature which permits
local governments to require park dedications as a condition for subdivi-
sion map approval.(1) California communities have taken advantage of the
enabling legislation , 56% require park dedications or in-lieu fees.
Livermore's requirement of two acres per hundred dwelling units puts it
among the 6% of communities with the largest land dedication require-
ments. However, Livermore's in-lieu fee is close to the average for all
communities, which is probably due to Livermore's low land costs in rela-
tion to other California communities.(2)
Annexation Fee. The annexation fee was charged to developers requesting
annexation by the city. The fee was considered the newly annexed land
owners way of buying into city facilities paid for by existing property
owners. The fee was charged to the units in Suburban Homes, but has
since been dropped by the city.
Storm Drainage. Storm drainage in Livermore is transported to the San
Francisco Bay through a system of arroyos maintained by Alameda County.
The county charges a storm drainage fee of $120 per unit which has not
changed in 20 years. The city is responsible for installing a drainage
(1) California Government Code, Section 6647.
(2) Construction Industry Research Board, "Quimby Act Survey Park and
Recreation Dedications and Fees, California Cities and Counties",
(Los Angeles, November 1981) p. 2.
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system to carry water from properties to the arroyos. The city drainage
system is developed partially by requiring builders to install drainage
lines for their sites up to 18 inches in diameter and payment of a fee.
If a developer is adjacent to a large drainage line and pipe in excess of
18 inches must be installed the developer is paid an over sizing credit.
Though runoff generated by parcels may vary considerably, the fees
are the same for all users. Residential development is charged a stan-
dard fee per lot and commercial and industrial users are charged by
square feet of impervious surface. The total cost of the system (the
value of the existing system in current dollars plus the estimated cost
of future improvements for undeveloped portions of the city) is divided
by the total number of users (existing uses plus future uses to be
accommodated on undeveloped land by 1990) to determine an average fee to
be charged each user. The average cost method was used since it was felt
that "storm drainage is a community problem for which all developing
properties have a responsibility".(1) The city storm drainage fee is
tied to a construction cost index and revised every year. Storm drainage
fees are placed in a special fund out of which improvements to
Livermore's drainage system, and over sizing credits to developers, are
financed.
Sewer Connection Fee. The sewer connection fee is currently calculated
by dividing total capital costs for treatment plants and trunk lines
(1) Daniel Lee, and R.W. Dondo, "Storm Drainage Fee Study", City of
Livermore Department of Public Works, April 1977.
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which will be needed through 1990 by the projected number of new connec-
tions for that time period. In this way capital costs are equally
divided among all users. Maintenance and operating expenditures are met
with service charges. Capital cost estimates are adjusted annually
through the use of a construction cost index for sewers and treatment
plants prepared by the Federal Water Pollution Control Administration.
The sewer connection fee is currently the largest single development
fee and has shown the most rapid growth. The fee has increased from $150
in 1956 to $2,045 in 1982. The fee growth reflects a change in treatment
quality from secondary to tertiary as well as inflation in construction
costs.(1)
School Fee. In 1977 the California Legislature decreed that when
overcrowding exists in local schools a city may as "an interim method of
providing classroom facilities" require developers to dedicate land or
pay an in-lieu fee.(2) A controversy erupted over the definition of
interim facilities with developers claiming that interim meant temporary
buildings, and cities interpreting it to mean permanent buildings. The
meaning of interim was later clarified by Assembly Bill 8, passed in
1979, which defined interim facilities as being temporary classrooms.
(1) Daniel Lee, "Revenue Program For Sanitary Sewer Connection Fees and
Service Charges".
(2) California Government Code, Section 65974. Sometimes referred to as
SB210.
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Livermore currently charges developers a school fee of $570 per
unit. The local high school is considered overcrowded and school fees
are being used to purchase portable classrooms. The school fee is calcu-
lated by projecting the cost of porable classrooms which will be needed
divided by the number of new units which will generate the need. (1)
Tax On Residential Construction. The tax on residential construction,
some times referred to as a bedroom tax in other localities, is techni-
cally a business license tax. The tax amounts to 1.75% of the estimated
construction cost of new units or $650 per unit, whichever is greater.
The residential construction tax was originally enacted to cover the
"other" growth costs not addressed by existing fees. When first enacted,
the receipts from this tax were divided between the local park district
and the city. The city share was used for capital facilities. The tax
was subsequently targeted entirely for capital facilities. As of 1982,
the park district receives 40% of receipts from the tax on residential
construction and the remaining 60% are placed in the city general fund
for unrestricted use. In other jurisdictions, this tax has been
justified as a "charge for buying into the physical infrastructure of the
community".(2)
(1) Interview with Rudolph D'Ambra, Director Facilities management,
Livermore Valley Unified School District, January 22, 1982.
(2) Dean Misczynski, Land Use and Proposition 13: The California
Experience. (Cambridge: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy,
undated). p. 2.
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Alameda County Water Connection Charge. The Alameda County water con-
nection charge was instituted in 1972 and was $450 for a typical single
family home. The 1982 fee level is $830. The fee was instituted at a
time when securing voter approval for new bond issues was difficult. The
fee is used to pay for expansion of production and distribution
facilities. The fee level is determined by averaging out the cost of
expanding the system among new users. All new development in Livermore
is liable for the fee since both the California Water Service Company and
the City of Livermore purchase water from the county water agency.
In-Lieu Low Income Housing Fee. The City of Livermore has an
inclusionary zoning statute which requires 10% of a developer's units to
be sold at a price which can be afforded by low/moderate income persons.
There are no resale controls on units falling under this program. If a
developer wishes, the in-lieu low income housing fee can be paid instead
of reserving 10% of the units for low/mod income. The in-lieu fee is
$443 for each unit built. The only restriction on the use of the fee by
the city is that it must be an expense related to the construction of low
income housing. The per unit fee was based on the land cost of
low/moderate income units (which are assumed to be constructed at a high
density). For every 10 units constructed $4430 is contributed in
fees which is equivalent to the land cost of a single unit of
low/moderate income housing.
in-lieu
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APPENDIX C
METHOD OF CALCULATION FOR SCENARIOS
HOME MORTGAGE PAYMENTS
Bank of America mortgage terms and requirements are used to calculate
home mortgage payments. The bank's maximum mortgage is 80% and an annual
income of four times the sum of annual mortgage and tax payments is
required. Mortgage interest rates for 1966 and 1981 were obtained from
the Bank of America, Livermore.
PROPERTY TAX PAYMENTS
Property taxes for units in 1966 and 1981 were calculated with property
tax rates for Livermore supplied by the Alameda County Assessors Office.
Tax payment = Tax rate x (home value - exemption)
There was no home owner exemption in 1966. Home owner exemption for 1981
was $7,000. Tax rates (on 100% assessed valuation) were 2.7475% for 1966
and, 1.3595% for 1981.
ANNUAL COST OF MUNICIPAL BONDS
All municipal bonds are assumed to have a 30 year term (so they can be
compared with mortgages with 30 year term) and to pay an interest rate
equal to the prevailing AAA municipal bond rate for the year it was
issued. The annual cost of bonds was calculated in the following manner:
Annual Cost = (Face Value x Interest) + payment to sinking fund
The sinking fund is for the purpose of paying off the bond at maturity
and is assumed to be invested at the prevailing interest rate for long
term Federal securities.
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ESTIMATE OF FEES COLLECTED 1959-1981
The total amount of growth-impact and utility fees collected was deter-
mined by multiplying an estimated average fee for each year by the number
of units in all subdivisions accepted by the Livermore City Council for
that year. Average fees were estimated using Fee Sheets (sheets supplied
to developers by the city which list all fees) for past years. The num-
ber of units in subdivisions accepted by the Livermore City Council was
determined from the Livermore Subdivision Record. See Table 1C. Subdi-
vision fees paid for multiple unit residences were estimated by multiply-
ing the number of units constructed by average fee levels (See Table 2C).
Guarantee bonds posted by developers for each year were obtained from the
Livermore Subdivision Record, which is a list of all subdivisions of
record in Livermore.
SPECIAL NOTE ON TABLE 10 e
The annual mortgage payment reduction for the $200,000 home was calculat-
ed on the following assumptions: Subdivision improvement costs are 33%
higher than for the median priced ($96,000) unit. Fees are also $1750
higher than the median price home as a result of the 1.75% residential
construction tax. Property taxes for all units in Table 10 are made by
multiplying the additional tax rate from Table 9 by the value of the
house less the home owners exemption of $7,000. In reality long time
home owners pay taxes at a lower effective rate than new home buyers
since Proposition 13 places a lid on increases in assessed valuation
until a unit changes hands, at which time it is reassessed at full market
value.
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TABLE 1C
LIVERMORE DEVELOPMENT FEES
AND SUBDIVISION IMPROVEMENTS FOR
SINGLE FAMILY HOMES 1950-1981
Year
Units
Constructed
1950-1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1846
605
771
233
188
418
4o6
1059
1214
682
1359
583
106
563
763
385
210
381
154
7
33
Improvement
Bonds
2,215,200
730,038
412,441
284,651
249,243
522,335
349,700
2,732,421
1,894,594
836,076
2,323,318
984,091
201,750
1,305,819
1,984,221
160,215
840,563
512,985
9,000
68,000
Per Unit
Fees*
-0-1
513
513
513
513
513
513
513
695
695
720
775
1266
1328
1775
3303
3465
3934
4437
4231
4535
5182
6132
6573
Total
Fees
-0-
310,365
395,523
119,529
96,444
214,434
208,278
543,267
843,730
473,990
978,480
451,825
134,196
747,664
1,354,325
1,271,655
727,650
1,498,854
683,298
31,745
171,006
18,615,661 11,256,258
* Growth Impact and Utility Fees
Units and improvement bonds for each year from Livermore
Subdivision Record. Per unit fees for each year estimated
from Livermore Fee Sheets 1970-1981 and from various
Department of Public Works Reports.
101 a
Total 11,966
TABLE 2C
ESTIMATE OF FEES
FROM MULTI-FAMILY UNITS
1960-1981
T ime
Period
1960-1970
1970-1974
1974-1981
Units
1,012
1,038
234
Average
Fee
Per Unit
526
1,868
4,141.
2,284
Bond Interest Rates Used
Total
Fees
532,312
1,938,984
968,994
3,440,290
Bond
Payment*
26,234
134,365
63,382
223,981
Time Period Municipal Bond Rate Government Securities
1960-1970
1970-1974
1974-1981
3.27
5.70
5.56
4.28
6.16
7.42
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TABLE 3C
ESTIMATE OF ANNUAL BOND PAYMENTS REQUIRED
FOR PUBLIC PROVISION OF SUBDIVISION IMPROVEMENTS
AND FEES
Municipal
Bond
Interest
RateYear
1950-1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
3.56
3.95
3.73
3.46
3.18
3.23
3.22
3.27
3.82
3.98
4.51
5.81
6.51
5.70
5.27
5.18
6.09
6.89
6.49
5.56
5.90
5.92
7.85
10.10
Bond Payments For
(See Table 2C)
Government
Securities
Interest
Rate
3.32
4.33
4.12
3.88
3.95
4.oo
4.19
4.28
4.92
5.07
5.65
6.67
7.37
6.16
6.21
6.84
7.56
7.99
7.61
7.42
8.41
9.44
11.46
13.12
Apartment
Bond
Payments
For
Improvements
118,059
41,152
22,592
15,026
12,406
26,184
17,300
135.834
104,605
45,709
136,028
68,229
15,138
90,489
128,967
10 , 045
62,594
40,345
606
4,484
$ 1,095,792
Fees
Bond
Payments
For
Fees
17,875
21,665
6,310
4,801
10,749
10,303
27,006
45,105
25,913
57,289
31,326
10,070
51,811
87,881
79,726
57,106
111,983
2,133
11,278
$ 670,400
223,981
$ 894,381
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